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ABSTRACT
THE PACIFIC WAR CRIMES TRIALS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "SMALL
FRY" VS. THE "BIG FISH"
Lisa Kelly Pennington
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Maura Hametz

In the post-World War II era, the Allied nations faced multiple issues, from
occupying the Axis countries and rebuilding Europe and Japan to trying war criminals for
atrocities committed prior to and during the war. War crimes trials were an important
part of the occupation process and by conducting the trials, the Allied nations hoped not
only to punish war criminals, but to provide examples of democratic principles to the
former Axis powers and deter future wartime atrocities. When considering war crimes
trials, it is most often Nuremberg that comes to mind, and it is Nuremberg that has
dominated much of written history since the trials took place. However, the Pacific saw
over 2,000 war crimes trials and over 5,000 defendants, divided into Class A and Class
BC categories, with trials conducted by several Allied nations. In the Pacific arena, the
Class BC suspects were considered "small fiy" compared to the "big fish" suspects such
as Hideki Tojo who were tried as Class A criminals in Tokyo.
The Allies' goals in the Pacific were to punish war criminals and instill
democratic principles in Japan. Given the realities of the post-war period and the
differences between the trials, did the Tokyo Trial and the Class BC trials held by the
United States at Yokohama accomplish what they intended? This study argues that the
Class BC trials at Yokohama were more successful in accomplishing the goals of the
United States in the post-war era, and played the more important role in global politics.

The Tokyo Trial, while more widely known, was primarily a show trial designed to
symbolize the end of a militaristic Japan, and instead of punishing war criminals the
countries involved pursued their own private political agendas.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The end of World War II left the Allies with a long list of tasks to accomplish to
help the world recover from a brutal and far reaching war. The war resulted not only in
the destruction of large parts of Europe and Asia, but it also saw wartime atrocities never
before imagined. These atrocities could not be ignored, and in addition to rebuilding
Europe and the Pacific, the Allies were determined to conduct trials to hold responsible
those who committed war crimes.
The Allies conducted trials in both Europe and the Pacific. Nuremberg and the
horrific stories about the Holocaust captured the world's attention. The trials in the
Pacific received scant attention compared to those in Nuremberg. Even the trial of the
major war criminals held at Tokyo, including Hideki Tojo, the former Minister of War,
was virtually ignored.
After the trials Nuremberg remained the focal point and it has dominated much of
written history about post war trials. Often, the only Pacific trial remembered is the
Tokyo Trial, generally considered the only important trial that occurred in the Pacific.
Solis Horwitz, an American prosecutor during the trial, described the Tokyo Trial "one of
the most important trials in world history" due to its "outstanding example of concerted
actions by eleven nations representing more than one-half of the peoples in the world"
and its significance "to all who are concerned with the elimination of war as a means of
settling international differences and with the establishment of a system of world peace
and order under law."1 The President of the Tokyo Tribunal Sir William Webb declared

1

Solis Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," International Conciliation no. 457 (January 1950): 475.
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shortly after the tribunal convened, "there has been no more important criminal trial in all
history."2
The Allies divided war crimes into three classes. Class A crimes, or crimes
against peace, constituted the "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a declared
or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Class B crimes, or conventional war crimes,
concerned the violations of the rules or customs of warfare. Class C crimes, considered
crimes against humanity, were defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."3 In the Pacific between
1946 and 1949 Class B and Class C trials predominated.
The purpose of dividing war crimes trials into three classes was to punish those
who committed war time atrocities according to the severity of their crimes. Crimes
against peace were considered the most serious. Behind the scenes several other factors
and goals of the Allied nations influenced the trials, which developed in different ways.
By the time the trials concluded, the Class A and Class BC trials had accomplished
different things. The Tokyo Trial had served as an education tool and the representative
end to an era of Japanese militarism and ushered in a new and, more importantly,

2

R. John Pritchard, "An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo War Trial," Nissan
Occasional Paper Series No. 5, 1987.
3 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC, from Washington, 22 September 1945. MacArthur Memorial
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "12 September 1945-21 June 1946."
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democratic period for Japan. The Class BC trials at Yokohama punished war criminals in
the manner stated in the Potsdam Declaration and also proved more useful in the global
political arena than the Class A trial.
The Class BC trials were not considered important, even as they were taking
place. Class BC criminals were "small fry" according to a memo of 12 November 1945,
which pushed for prompt conclusion of the trials after they had already begun. The
United States wanted a rapid first conviction, whether it was of General Yamashita in the
Philippines or of another "small fry" defendant.4 At the outset, the United States was in a
hurry to begin punishing war criminals. This quickly changed as tensions arose between
the United States and Soviet Union. In contrast, Class A war criminals tried in Tokyo
were considered the "big fish," responsible for planning an aggressive war. The purpose
of this study is to show that the forgotten BC trials accomplished what they set out to do.
They were also used as a tool by the United States in their mission to turn Japan into an
ally against Communism in East Asia.
The legacy of the Tokyo Trial is steeped in controversy. Often viewed as a show
trial riddled with procedural flaws that resulted in victor's justice for the Allied nations, it
was touted as an important and fair trial of Japan's wartime leaders. Issues raised by the
defense and even some of the judges questioned the validity of their jurisdiction at the
conclusion of court proceedings. The first published work on the Tokyo Trial written in
1950 by American prosecutor Solis Horwitz, presents the general background to and
description of the trial. Though Horwitz supported the trial and its accomplishments, he

4

CINCAFPAC (for Whitlock) from CINCAFPAC ADV Marshall, 12 November 1945. MacArthur
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "12 September 1945-21 June 1946."
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alluded not only to the fact that other opinions of the trial might arise but also to the
tensions that emerged between the United States and Soviet Union:
Amidst the tensions of the new post-war conflicts the members of the Tribunal might
have succumbed to a feeling that their task was a futile one. It is of the utmost
significance that they did not succumb, but, even under the impact of events which might
foreshadow a conflict more horrible than the one just concluded, they elected to reaffirm
as an act of faith, their conviction that war was not a necessary concomitant of
international life and that acknowledged principles of law and justice were fully
applicable to nations and their leaders. Whatever may be the ultimate decision on the
merits of this judgment, perhaps the real significance of the work of the Tokyo Tribunal
lies in this act of faith.5
Aside from Horwitz's description of the trial, the trial record, and sources that
focused on the international law aspect published soon after the trial's conclusion, the
first work to critically examine the Tokyo Trial was not published until 1971. Richard
Minear's Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial relied heavily on the record of
the trial proceedings as well as a few secondary works that briefly mentioned the trial but
did not go into detail. Minear used Japanese language sources in his work and bluntly
stated in his preface that his task was "to demolish the credibility of the Tokyo Trial and
its verdict."6 He then proceeded to attack all aspects of the trial, from the Charter to the
judgment. As a work of political scholarship, he focused on international law and the
legal conflicts that arose during the trial, many of which were genuine concerns brought
up before the tribunal. However, the angry tone of his work detracts from the important
questions he raised. Minear, heavily influenced by the Vietnam War, hoped that "an
awareness of the absurdities and the inequities of the Tokyo Trial will help us to rethink
some of our assumptions about American policy in Asia, about Japan, and about

5

Horwitz, "The Tokyo Trial," 575 (italics added).
Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1971), ix.
6
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Indochina."7 The text is an easy read, especially given the technical international law
Minear deals with, but it is difficult to separate his judgment from the concerns he raises
about the legal legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial.
The next major work to focus on the Tokyo Trial, published in 1987 by Arnold C.
Brackman, a United Press staff correspondent who covered the Tokyo Trial, detailed all
aspects of the trial. Present for most of the trial, Brackman saved the transcripts
presented to the press of each day's testimony. Aside from the transcripts, Brackman
relied on the material in his own files from his time in Japan, news stories, official court
records, and interviews with participants. Brackman offers an in-depth look at the Tokyo
Trial that presents the problems that arose during the trial. His text is not intended as
historical analysis but as a journalistic accounting of the trial. He succeeds in presenting
a thorough explanation of the court proceedings, the key people involved, and the issues.
In the 1980s, as trial records became declassified, historians began to reconsider
the legacy of the Tokyo Trial. In 2001, Timothy Maga argued that the Tokyo Trial had
• ft
good intentions and "might even have done good work.'

Maga was criticized for failure

to appropriately analyze and an apparent attempt to cover too many topics in too short a
work. Maga introduced some of the lesser trials, specifically those held by the United
States on Guam and ended his text by tying the Tokyo Trial's legacy to the creation of a
permanent international tribunal to try war criminals. Maga raised an interesting point of
view on the trials but a more narrow focus or a longer text would have allowed for a more
thorough review.

7

Minear, Victor's Justice, xiv.
Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2001), ix.

8 Timothy

6

Yuma Totani in 2008 also challenged the negative view of the Tokyo Trial and
provided a bibliography detailing the extensive archival and primary resources used in
the text as well as a plethora of secondary sources. A Japanese historian trained in the
United States, Totani's sources are both English and Japanese, allowing him to offer the
Japanese perspective on the trials usually lacking in English language works. Perhaps
most helpful is Totani's discussion of the analysis of the Tokyo Trial, beginning with the
positive view taken by the first trial analysts who often saw the trial as a success, to the
idea the trial was victor's justice and finally the slowly evolving opinion that the trial was
not simply designed for revenge as more records are declassified and made available to
historians. Totani seems to agree with Awaya Kentaro who argued that the trial "was
neither a revenge trial nor a just trial, but one that fell somewhere in between."9 This
stance does not really further the argument that the trial was a positive force, nor
completely refute the argument that the trial was victor's justice, but the work offers
evidence for both points of view.
Three English language memoirs by or about the Tokyo defendants exist. Two
are by Class A criminals who were arrested and held at Sugamo Prison, but never tried.
Both are titled Sugamo Diary and offer clues about the life of the suspects of all classes
of war crimes held at Sugamo. Yoshio Kodama's memoir is more positive about the
United States than Ryoichi Sasakawa's, but both authors to some extent disagree with the
trials.10 Kodama did not feel the trials would accomplish their goals, while Sasakawa
believed the United States should focus instead on communism and hoped to use his

9

Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II
(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 247-248.
10 Yoshio Kodama, Sugamo Diary (Tokyo: Radiopress, 1960) and Ryoichi Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
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position as a Class A suspect to defend Japan and educate the world on the events that led
Japan to act aggressively. Sasakawa's memoir clearly has an agenda, but even Kodama's
work must be critically examined given his position as a suspected war criminal facing
the possibility of a trial.
Shinsho Hanayaman's memoir, The Way of Deliverance: Three Years with the
Condemned Japanese War Criminals offers a different perspective.11 Hanayaman was
the Buddhist priest who administered to the prisoners at Sugamo. His work centered on
his interactions with the suspected war criminals, particularly those who were condemned
to death, including the seven major war criminals from the Tokyo Trial. Hanayaman
tried to refrain from politics and focus instead on the spiritual experiences and lives of the
men in prison. Since Hanayaman was often the last person to interact with the
condemned men prior to their execution, he was able to relay their final messages and
actions, which is a unique perspective in the literature that generally focuses only on the
wrongdoings committed. Hanayaman did not go so far as to apologize for the war
criminals, but often speaks highly and respectfully of them.
In addition to these major texts, various articles and portions of monographs focus
on the Tokyo Trial. The topics vary widely and cover ideas from aspects of international
law, the controversies, the defendants, and the dissents produced by several of the
justices. Few works however focus solely on the Tokyo Trial like Minear and Brackman.
Many seek to place the trial in the context of World War II or the emerging Cold War.
For the most part, the trial is still viewed negatively, though Totani suggests that new
scholars will soon challenge that view.

11

Shinsho Hanayaman, The Way of Deliverance: Three Years with the Condemned Japanese War
Criminals (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950).

In contrast, little has been published on the Class BC trials. In 1979 Philip
Piccigallo published a study entitled The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes
Operations in the East, 1945-1951. Piccigallo's study was the first English language text
to deal with the Class BC trials. After a chapter devoted to the Tokyo Trial, the text
served as an overview to the many lesser trials conducted in the Pacific by the various
Allied nations. Piccigallo's work is organized by Allied country and in an effort to
present a balanced view on each nation that conducted trials, each chapter offers
information on the procedure and machinery used to conduct the trials, as well as the
trials themselves and the outcome. Piccigallo relied heavily on governmental records
regarding court proceedings and generally argues that the lesser trials were fair and
effective in punishing Japanese war criminals, a task he deemed necessary. He was
straightforward in his intent and stated his work was focused on operational aspects of the
trials. Piccigallo hoped to inspire further inquiry into the trails, and to "rescue lesser
Japanese trials from historical oblivion."12 His work was generally well received, and his
main contribution was the introduction of the lesser trials to the attention of a wider
audience.13 He cites a need for additional research into that area and accomplishes his
goal of offering an overview of the procedure of the lesser trials.
John L. Ginn, an American stationed at Sugamo Prison in 1948, published a work
in 1992 that focused on Sugamo, and the trial and sentencing of war criminals of all three
classes. Like Piccigallo's work, Ginn's provides an overview of the trials. He detailed
select Class BC cases and provided a listing of all the Class BC trials at Yokohama as

12

Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), xiii-xiv.
13 Mark R. Peattie, Review of The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 19451951, by Philip R. Piccigallo. American Historical Review 86 no. 3(June 1981): 639-640.
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well as the verdicts and sentences of the defendants. The driving force behind his text
however, is the prison itself and the Americans who served there. Ginn offers a look at
how Sugamo Prison functioned and the lives of the American soldiers stationed there.
He also provides background information on the war crimes trials, but the text is a
memoir and does not analyze the importance of the trials. The text is useful for
background reading and for the list of the outcomes of the Class BC trials at Yokohama
however.
Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of the Class BC criminals.
Sandra Wilson's study of the Class BC criminals and their campaign for release after the
trials concluded sheds light on these lesser known criminals and their political activity
while serving their prison sentences.14 The Class BC prisoners were widely supported in
Japan after the war and the public was very much involved in the fight for their release.
While Wilson's work does not focus on the trials themselves, she offers a unique
perspective on the lives of the "small fry" and their importance, and demonstrates how
Japan did not forget these men after the peace treaty was signed and Japan regained its
sovereignty. Wilson makes use of Japanese language sources, which allow her to present
the Japanese view on the condemned men and counter the American view on the release
of war criminals.
Overall, English language sources on the Japanese war crimes trials are limited.
A few memoirs by Japanese participants were published, though they are memoirs of
Class A prisoners. Currently no English translations of memoirs by Class BC prisoners
exist. Government documents, including the trial records, are plentiful but offer only

14 Sandra

Wilson, "Prisoners in Sugamo and Their Campaign for Release," Japanese Studies 31 no. 2
(2011): 171-190
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American perspectives on the trials. The Class A trial record does include the dissenting
opinions of several justices, but unlike the Nuremberg Trial, the Tokyo proceedings were
not widely published and distributed. The dissenting opinions however do offer
perspectives on the trial from other Allied countries and provide support for those critical
of the trial. The Class A trial record has been examined, most extensively by R. John
Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide who compiled the court proceedings into a 22
volume set. No compilation or extensive study of the Class BC trial records exists.
Piccigallo stated, "such an attempt, although ultimately needed, would demand Herculean
effort—certainly exceeding the capabilities of one individual—and must therefore await
the combined labor of future scholars."15 The United States alone conducted over 400
Class BC trials, resulting in a massive number of records.
The University of California at Berkeley offers the Judge Advocate General
Review synopses of 160 Yokohama trials through its War Crimes Study Center. The
Center holds microfilm copies of the trial records from the National Archives, and
provides the only online access to the information contained in the records. The entire
trial record is not reproduced online. The information provides the defendant's name,
charges and specifications, and the verdicts and sentences. In addition, comments from
the reviewing authority are included as well as a very brief description of the arguments
of the prosecution and defense. The project is far from complete, and each case
presented on the website does not contain all the relevant information. The synopses do
offer a starting point for the Yokohama trials and may be used to choose specific trials for
further research, though only approximately half of the trials have synopses.

15

Piccigallo, The Japanese on Tried, xiii-xiv.
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The Class BC trials were just as large an undertaking as the Class A trial, if not
larger. The Class BC trials involved more defendants and required more time than the
Class A trial. With constantly changing military commissions, the lesser trials were
forced to carefully consider procedure in order to ensure each defendant received a fair
trial. Perhaps because they lacked the prestige and limelight of the Class A trial, the
Class BC trials were able to focus on punishing Japan's war criminals and prove useful as
a bargaining chip in the post-war era.

12

CHAPTER II
CLASS A WAR CRIMES TRIAL: TOKYO
The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 set the goal of the war crimes trials in
the Pacific theater. The United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China stated
that while they did not intend to enslave the Japanese or destroy them as a race, "stern
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties
upon our prisoners."1 The Potsdam Declaration also called for the Japanese government
to remove all obstacles to the establishment of democratic principles among the Japanese
people.2 The war crimes trials offered the Allies an opportunity to model democratic
principles for the Japanese, and demonstrate the process of fair trials.3
With the goals of punishing war criminals and turning Japan into a democracy in
mind, the Allied nations set up individual commissions to prosecute Class BC criminals,
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) to try the Class A
suspects.
The Tokyo Trial was steeped in controversy, and it is often denounced as a show
trial and an example of "victor's" justice since the judges appointed to the Tribunal all
represented victor nations. The defense challenged the court, stating that the tribunal
members represented the accusers and were therefore unable to be impartial.4 This is
only one of the many problems that would arise as the United States sought to assert itself
in its newfound superpower role in the aftermath of the war.

1

Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, Article 10.
Potsdam Declaration, Article 10.
3 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 7.
4Minear, Victor's Justice, 77.
2
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As the trial progressed and stretched far past the six months initially allotted for
the court proceedings, it was clear that the United States had concerns other than the
punishment of Japan's major war criminals. Ultimately, the trial served more as the
finale to the war in the Pacific theater and ushered in a new era as the United States
followed its own separate agenda. Japan's major war criminals were sentenced, but even
some of the tribunal members questioned the validity of their jurisdiction and ability to
impose punishment on the twenty-five men who would sit in the dock in Tokyo.

ESTABLISHING THE IMTFE: EARLY CONFLICTS
Several documents led to the establishment of the IMTFE in January 1946. In
addition to the Potsdam Declaration, the Cairo Declaration and the Instrument of
Surrender contributed to the IMTFE's creation. The Cairo Declaration, signed by the
United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain on 1 December 1943 was an
agreement between the Allies to "restrain and punish the aggression of Japan."5 The
Declaration described the Allies' intention to return all the territory Japan occupied
during the war, and their desire for an unconditional surrender.6 On 2 September 1945,
representatives for Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese government signed the Instrument
of Surrender, placing all Japanese armed forces under Allied control. The Instrument of
Surrender guaranteed that the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration, including war

5
6

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment (Tokyo, November 1948), Part A, 2.
IMTFE, Judgment, Part A, 2-3.

crimes trials, would be carried out as ordered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP.)7
After the surrender, the United States occupied Japan. A law making body for the
Occupation, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), was founded in December 1945.

The

FEC's purpose was to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards" for the Japanese
surrender and subsequent Occupation by Allied forces. At the Moscow Conference on 26
December 1945, the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and the Republic of China
agreed that the Supreme Commander had the power to "issue all orders for the
implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and
directives supplementary hereto."8 President Truman designated General Douglas
MacArthur as Supreme Commander.9 Truman wanted MacArthur to have "complete
command and control" in Japan. The United States assured its Allies of a cooperative
effort in the Occupation, but stated where disagreements arose, "the policies of the
United States will govern."10
Overseeing the war crimes trials was one of General MacArthur's responsibilities
as SCAP. Washington urged MacArthur to begin preparing for war crimes trials soon
after the Instrument of Surrender was signed, and the Class BC trials began fairly
quickly. The Class A trial took much longer to organize. MacArthur did not approve the
IMTFE Charter and officially establish the Tribunal until 19 January 1946. The conflicts
over the role of the IMTFE that arose early in the Occupation indicated that the United
7

IMTFE, Judgment, Instrument of Surrender, 4-5.
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured documents/iapanese surrender document (accessed 22
September 2011).
8 IMTFE, Judgment, 5.
9 MacArthur, as the Commander in Chief of the Far East Command was already in control of all American
military forces in the Pacific, and was in charge after the surrender of Japan. The Moscow Conference,
with the agreement of the eleven Allied nations, made MacArthur's role as SCAP official.
10 Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 6.

15

States was more concerned with appearances and a successful Occupation than with the
punishment of war criminals.
In early October 1945, MacArthur requested permission of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to proceed with a Class A trial of Hideki Tojo for the bombing of Pearl Harbor.11
A second memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 October 1945 reiterated his request.
MacArthur also asked that the commission for such a trial be composed solely of United
States personnel, as the attack on Pearl Harbor affected only United States citizens.12
"Any criminal responsibility attached to Japanese political leaders for the decision to
wage war should be limited to an indictment for the attack on Pearl Harbor, since this act
was effected without a prior declaration of war as required by international law and
custom," he argued.13
The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. On two separate occasions in November
1945 Washington sent MacArthur directives stating that Tojo and other major war
criminals would be tried by an International Tribunal. Creating an International Tribunal
assisted the United States in maintaining its policy of allowing other Allied nations to
have input in the Occupation process. A memo on 11 November 1945 informed
MacArthur that the United States had already requested that Allied signatories of the
Instrument of Surrender nominate personnel for an International Tribunal.14 This

11 WARCOS from CINCAFPAC ADV, 7 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Record Group 9,
Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946."
12 WARCOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) from CINCAFPAC ADV, 31 October 1945. MacArthur Memorial
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 21 September 1945-21 June
1946."
13 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1964), 318.
14 CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC from Washington, 4 November 1945. MacArthur Memorial
Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June
1946" and CINCAFPAC ADVANCE, CINCAFPAC Manila (MacArthur), 11 November 1945. MacArthur
Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21
June 1946."
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decision also demonstrated United States' cooperation with its Allies in the matter of war
crimes trials, and MacArthur was forced to abandon his objections.
Not only did Washington disagree with MacArthur on occasion, it did not always
agree with its Allies. Washington took advantage of its position to impose its will where
disagreements arose. The most prominent example of this policy concerned Emperor
Hirohito. The United States was not opposed to trying Hirohito as a war criminal but was
not willing to raise the question of his trial until it was proven that the Occupation could
proceed without him.15 Therefore, the United States ordered MacArthur to collect
evidence but to take no action against the Emperor.16 MacArthur believed that Hirohito
should not be tried. A 2 October 1945 memo to MacArthur from his Military Secretary,
Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, detailed several reasons for not trying Hirohito as a
war criminal. Fellers described Hirohito as the "incarnation of national spirit, incapable
of wrong or misdeeds," and stated that "to try him as a war criminal would not only be
blasphemous but a denial of spiritual freedom."17 The Occupation also required the
services of the Emperor. On his order the military laid down its arms. Trying Hirohito as
a war criminal would cause Japan's government to collapse and might result in an
uprising requiring a larger expeditionary force and prolonging the occupation. Most
tellingly, Fellers concluded, "American long range interests require friendly relations
with the Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of
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paramount, national importance that Japan harbor no lasting resentment."18 This
statement suggests that the United States was more concerned with Occupation than the
punishment of war criminals and also suggests the United States counted on Emperor
Hirohito to ensure that the Occupation ran smoothly. It indicated the United States'
desire to contain communism was prominent very shortly after the conclusion of the war.
Japan's possible involvement in containment, though perhaps not the extent, was also
recognized. A memo from 8 October 1945 also shows that the United States was very
concerned with a smooth Occupation. Early arrest of former high officials was deemed
advantageous to the United States, not for the purpose of punishing them as war
criminals, but to allow those who were not arrested to "attain a peace of mind to enable
them to devote their abilities, such as they may be, to the task of reforming and
rehabilitating the government in this country." Once officials realized arrests were
complete and they no long had anything to fear, they could focus on the business at
hand.19
MacArthur argued that Hirohito's role was largely ministerial, and that to place
the Emperor on trial would destroy the nation.20 MacArthur argued along the lines
proposed by Fellers, and due to his recommendation, Washington decided not to try
Hirohito. Other Allied countries, including Australia, objected. The Australians' list of
major war criminals contained 61 names, including that of Hirohito.
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The majority of the Japanese public appeared to agree with MacArthur. Between
November 1945 and January 1946, MacArthur received over 160 letters from the public
asking him to protect the emperor and preserve the imperial system.22 In many of the
letters, the writer's immediate concern was whether or not Hirohito would be tried as a
war criminal. In a study of the letters, Sodei Rinjiro states that 80 letters appear to have
been written in an organized effort to petition for the emperor's protection, as they all
come from the same prefecture and contain similar content. The 80 letters, in wording
that is very similar, stated, "You must not put the emperor on trial. Please, absolutely, do
not put the emperor on trial."23 Longer letters addressed to MacArthur contained similar
sentiments. It is not known for certain if these letters influenced MacArthur in his
decision to protect the emperor, or if they only cemented his commitment to keep
Hirohito out of the courtroom. Their existence supports MacArthur's assertion that
trying Hirohito as a war criminal could have detrimental effects on the population and
possibly create anti-American sentiment in Japan.
The Republic of the Philippines also wanted Hirohito to be tried as a war
criminal. The national executive of the Philippines Lawyers Guild, J. Antonio Araneta, a
longtime friend of MacArthur, cited Japanese law to prove that Hirohito was the head of
state, and as such, only he had the ability to initiate war. Araneta was convinced that
trying the Emperor would aid MacArthur in the Occupation and allow Japan to move
toward democracy. MacArthur was not swayed. Araneta appealed directly to President

September 1945-21 June 1946," and CINCAFPAC (MacArthur) from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff),
22 January 1946, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1
"Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946."
22 Sodei Rinjiro, Dear General MacArthur (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 63-67.
23 Rinjiro, Dear General MacArthur, 68.

Truman, who continued to back MacArthur's decision.24 This tenacity suggests that the
United States was more concerned with overseeing a stable occupation than with
punishing war criminals or appeasing allies.
The United States was not the only party interested in protecting the Emperor.
The defendants also worked to keep Hirohito's name out of the trial. Although they did
not work to clear his name for the same reasons, Hideki Tojo and Chief Prosecutor
Joseph B. Keenan worked together at one point to clarify Tojo's statements that appeared
to implicate Hirohito. Keenan supported MacArthur's decision against trying Hirohito.
If Hirohito were labeled a criminal, the newfound cooperation between the United States
and Japan would weaken and perhaps turn into anti-American sentiment.25 Tojo, on the
other hand, worked to protect Hirohito because of his reverence for his Emperor. Under
cross examination by Keenan, Tojo at one point remarked that Hirohito had consented,
albeit reluctantly to war. He added that no one dared to act against the Emperor's will,
suggesting that had the Emperor so chosen, he could have stopped the war. This seemed
to indicate Hirohito's guilt. Keenan and Tojo both realized the gravity of the situation,
and Keenan secretly appealed to Tojo through Marquis Kido to clarify his statement at
the next opportunity, even if the clarification was detrimental to himself. A week after
his initial statements, Tojo, again under cross examination by Keenan, stated that war was
decided on in his cabinet, and on his advice and the advice of the high command, the
Emperor reluctantly consented to war. Tojo went on to say that the Emperor harbored
love and desire for peace, even during the war, and that Hirohito's declaration of war on
8 December 1941 contained the sentiment that "this war is indeed unavoidable and is
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against my own desires."

Assuming responsibility for the trial was not just a sentiment

Tojo expressed in the courtroom. He made the same statements to Yoshio Kodama,
another Class A suspect housed at Sugamo Prison who was released before being brought
to trial. Kodama recorded a conversation with Tojo in his prison diary in which Tojo
stated "if a man's life expectancy is 50 years, then I have had 10 extra years. It will make
no difference as far as my own fate is concerned whether I take responsibility for one
thing or for everything. I shall therefore take the responsibility of as many things as I
can. In any case, it is I who am responsible for the Pacific War."27 Kodama's diary entry
does not offer clues to whether the confession was a sincere claim or simply a continuing
expression of his loyalty to the emperor, or a combination of the two.
Hirohito remained on the throne. The outcome of the situation proved that the
United States was firmly in charge and in this instance using its authority as the leader of
the Occupation to direct the outcome of the trial and pursue its own agenda. The show of
power was important for the United States given rapidly increasing tensions with the
Soviet Union. Assuming the leadership role and taking a strong stance during the Tokyo
Trial let the remaining Allied countries know that the United States occupied a position
of such power that it did not have to bend to the will of their Allies in the post war world
but was strong enough to dictate how the recovery of Japan should progress.

THE IMTFE CHARTER: ORGANIZATION
MacArthur received a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 12
September 1945 expressing President Truman's desire to "proceed, without avoidable
26
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delay, with the trial before appropriate Military Courts or Tribunals and the punishment
of such Japanese War Criminals as have been or may be apprehended."28 In reality,
organizing the tribunal and appointing its members was a long and drawn out process and
eight months would pass before the Class A trial of high ranking Japanese officials at
Tokyo began. In the months between the 12 September memo and the convening of the
Class A trial on 3 May 1946, MacArthur appointed members to the tribunal, set the
guidelines for the trial, and prepared for its start.
MacArthur officially established the IMTFE on 19 January 1946 for "the trial of
those persons charged individually or as members of organizations or in both capacities
with offences which include crimes against peace."29 On the same date he approved the
Charter for the IMTFE which outlined the jurisdiction and general provisions of the
tribunal, defined the right of the accused to a fair trial, detailed the powers of the tribunal,
the process of the trial, and the right of the tribunal to pass judgment and sentences upon
the defendants. The Charter determined the basic organization of the Tribunal, allowing
for representatives from the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Australia, New
Zealand, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Canada.30
One of the members of the Tribunal would serve as President and act as
moderator during the proceedings.31 The US State Department requested designees from
the Allied countries for possible appointment to the tribunal. The designees were to be

28 JCS to Douglas MacArthur, 12 September 1945. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA, Record
Group 9, Box 159, Folder 1 "Radiograms 12 September 1945-21 June 1946."
29 Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, Part II: Allied Authority, 1. MacArthur Memorial Archives,
Norfolk, VA. Politics ofJapan September 1945-September 1948. Report of Government Section, SCAP:
423-427. Crimes against peace were considered the most serious war crime in the post war era. Only those
charged with Class A crimes were considered to be major war criminals.
30 SCAP, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo: SCAP, 1946), Article 1,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/govabov/hist250/assets/pdfs/imtfe.pdf (accessed 19 September 2011).
31 SCAP, Charter, Article 3a.
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military officers or qualified civilians, preferably with the ability to speak English. The
Soviet Union did not adhere to this request, and sent a justice who did not speak English,
perhaps to defy the United States and challenge its leading role during the trial.
MacArthur appointed judges to the tribunal from the designees.32 Only six members of
the Tribunal were required to be present to convene court proceedings, and a majority
vote by members present was necessary in order to make decisions, including convictions
and sentences. A tie vote would be decided by the President of the Tribunal.33 Unlike
Nuremberg, no alternates were provided to the judges in case of absence, and any judge
who missed court sessions continued to be able to participate in later proceedings unless
he declared himself unfit in open court.34 Several judges were absent for lengthy periods
during the trial including the Tribunal President, though none ever declared himself unfit
to continue with court proceedings. Each judge was responsible for familiarizing himself
with the testimony given during his absence. A judge's absence could be a disadvantage
to the defendants if the judge missed key testimony, but given the number of justices on
the bench at Tokyo it was not practical to house 11 additional alternate justices. Timothy
Maga stated the "strange" rule reflected the expectation of a fast moving trial.

The

defense opposed the rule, as a rapid trial was not in the best interests of its clients. The
tribunal ignored the objection, which became moot since the trial proceeded so slowly
that it was possible an absent justice would not miss a great deal of testimony.
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The Charter allowed for SCAP to appoint a Chief of Counsel, and any nation with
which Japan was at war was able to appoint Associate Counsels to assist the Chief.
This stipulation supported the argument that the tribunal was biased, since it was
composed only of enemy and victim nations. Article 9 addressed the right to a fair trial
for the accused. It required each defendant receive a copy of the indictment in a language
he understood in time to allow for an adequate defense. It also mandated English and
Japanese as the official languages of the trial proceedings, and allowed for translations of
documents as needed or requested. It was important that each defendant understood the
court proceedings and the charges against him. Guaranteeing the defendants trial
proceedings in their native language showed that the court was committed to carrying out
fair justice for the accused and was not simply rushing through the trial in order to exact
punishment, and demonstrated that democratic ideals trumped the desire for revenge. It
also allowed the defendant to prepare the best possible defense when he understood all
aspects of the court proceedings. The court remained committed to this right even though
translation difficulties between English and Japanese led to problems and often slowed
court proceedings while interpreters struggled to appropriately translate between the two
languages. By adhering to the rule throughout the trial, the Allies demonstrated
commitment to the rights of the defendants in a court of law.
Each defendant had the right to select his own defense counsel, and if he chose
not to exercise that right the tribunal could appoint his counsel. Adequate defense
counsel was an important idea in western jurisprudence and by ensuring the defendant
proper representation the Tokyo Trial would be viewed as treating the accused fairly and
36 SCAP, Charter, Article 8ab. By granting SCAP the authority to appoint the Chief of Counsel, this
responsibility was directly given to the Americans and ensured that the United States had control over this
role.

allowing him the best possible opportunity to present his case. The accused also had the
right to request witnesses or documents to aid in his defense, another example of
allowing the defendant ample opportunity to present his argument. The defendant had to
submit a written application to the tribunal explaining where the evidence requested was
located, as well as how the evidence was relevant to the defense. If the tribunal approved
the application, it would provide assistance in obtaining it.

Assistance in obtaining

evidence should have signaled fair treatment, although this was not always the case.
The rules of evidence for the Tribunal favored the prosecution however, making
its job to convict the defendants simpler. The Charter provided ground rules for evidence
in Section IV, Powers of Tribunal and Conduct of Trial. In Article 13, the Charter stated
that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. All purported admissions or
statements of the accused are admissible."38 This allowed the United States to easily
accomplish its goal of punishing major war criminals, but undermined the desire to
demonstrate democratic principles and fair trials. The American civilian perspective of
rules of evidence was more stringent and would not have allowed many of the items
listed in the Charter into evidence. The list of admissible evidence clearly demonstrates
the failure to adhere to common technical rules. "Regardless of its security classification
and without proof of its issuance or signature, which appears to the Tribunal to have been
signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of
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any government," any document was admissible.

Also acceptable were those which

appeared to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross, doctors, medical
service personnel, investigators, intelligence officers, or "any other person who appears
to the Tribunal to have personal knowledge of the matters contained in the report."40
Affidavits, diaries, letters, and sworn or unsworn statements that appeared to have
information related to the charge were admissible, as were copies if the original
document was unavailable.41 One of the most valuable pieces of evidence used by the
prosecution was the diary of Koichi Kido, Hirohito's advisor and Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal. Since Kido kept record of the years prior to and during the war, and since
those records contained information related to the charges, the diary was admitted as
evidence. Finally, the Tribunal did not require proof "of facts of common knowledge,
nor of the authenticity of official government documents and reports of any nation nor of
the proceedings, records, and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United
Nations."42 While the United States, some Tribunal members, and even some Japanese
argued that the Tokyo Trial was fair and just, the disregard for technical rules of evidence
did seem to bias the proceedings and aid the prosecution in making its case.
It is easy to criticize the tribunal for the relaxed rules of evidence; however the
IMTFE occupied a unique position. As a military court, it followed different rules than a
civilian court. Yet in its attempt to model western jurisprudence for the Japanese and at
the same time consider the problems associated with an international tribunal and the
39
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destruction of evidence, the tribunal was forced to alter the rules of evidence. While the
relaxed rules did aid the prosecution, the criticism of the court's bias against the defense
regarding evidence could stem from Webb's obvious contempt for the defendants.
A brief section of the Charter outlined the trial proceedings. After the indictment,
the accused made his plea, and the prosecution delivered opening statements. The
prosecution and defense then made their cases, and the Tribunal delivered the judgment
and sentences after deliberation.43 The Tribunal was able to impose any sentence it
deemed just, including death, if the defendants were convicted.44 Sentences could not be
carried out until approved by SCAP and SCAP could reduce or alter sentences, but not
increase their severity.45 The review process introduced a mechanism to ensure the trials
did not simply sentence all defendants to death to extract revenge for Japan's actions
during the war.

KEY PLAYERS: JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND APPOINTMENT
CONTROVERSY
While waiting for the nominations of judges from the Allied nations, MacArthur
established the International Prosecution Section (IPS) for the IMTFE. One of his first
appointments was Joseph B. Keenan as the Chief Prosecutor for the IPS. Keenan worked
in the Department of Justice from 1933 to 1939 and at one point was the Assistant
Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Criminal Division. He later served
as the Assistant to the Attorney General. At the time of his appointment as Chief
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Prosecutor of the IMTFE, Keenan had a private practice in Washington.46 President
Truman's Executive Order No. 9660 established Keenan's responsibilities as Chief
Prosecutor on 29 November 1945. The order allowed Keenan to "select and
recommend.. .necessary personnel to assist him in the performance of his duties" as well
as to "cooperate with, and to receive the assistance of, any foreign Government to the
extent deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his duties."47
A slow response from other Allied nations involved in the trial process delayed
the Tribunal. In October, governments were asked to provide designees, but it was not
until December that MacArthur received a message asking for further information
including the number of judges that would sit on the Tribunal, their rank, the rules and
jurisdiction of the court, and the organization of the prosecuting staff. Although
Washington asked MacArthur for his opinion on these matters, the JCS provided their
own "politically desirable" suggested answers: the Tribunal would consist of judges
nominated by the Allied government, as well as one alternate; each judge would hold the
rank of Major General or its equivalent; the jurisdiction of the court would only cover
Class A war criminals; and the rules of the court would be modeled after Nuremberg.
The original Charter called for nine members to sit on the Tribunal, although in
acknowledgement of international cooperation, the United States later amended the
charter to add a representative from India and the Philippines48
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Finally, each government would nominate one associate prosecutor to assist the
Chief Prosecutor. The JCS expressed their desire for the trial to begin on 15 January
1946 and set a 1 January 1946 deadline for nominations from the Allied nations.49
MacArthur, with input from Keenan, made only a few changes to the recommendations
provided by the JCS. He suggested that no alternates be provided, as "they will tend to
embarrass rather than facilitate the action, due to the many problems of accommodation,
transportation, and other local matters." MacArthur's memo also included a stipulation
that he, as SCAP, would designate the President of the Tribunal, as well as establish the
courts and its rules of procedure, including the admissibility of evidence. MacArthur
pushed the start date of the trial back to 1 February 1946 and requested that no publicity
be given to the trials until the indictment was delivered.50 Allied nations began to
provide nominations after they received the information on the organization of the
tribunal.51
A disagreement over the appointment of the United States representative indicated
that the Tokyo Trial was not held in high regard. On 18 January 1946, the day before
MacArthur established the IMTFE, Keenan recommended that the JCS nominate Willis
Smith, the President of the American Bar Association to the IMTFE.52 President Truman
however, designated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Council of Massachusetts
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Henri Bernard, France; Justice Bernard ROling, The Netherlands; I. M. Zaryanov, the Soviet Union; Lord
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John P. Higgins as the American representative.

It is unclear why Truman was so intent

on appointing Higgins. Brackman states that the reasons for the appointment were "lost
in the murky Democratic politics of the era."54 Keenan swiftly appealed to the United
States Attorney General, as well as to the Judge Advocate General (JAG) in Washington.
He urged the nomination of Higgins to be reconsidered, as the appointment "would not fit
in with any of the other appointments being made by the Allied Nations from the
standpoint of prestige and rank."55 Keenan wanted someone better known nationally and
opposed Higgins since he was known only within Massachusetts.56 He explained that
MacArthur intended to appoint the American judge as President of the Tribunal, which
made a more prestigious and well known American nominee necessary.57 Keenan's
sentiment was much the same in his message to the JAG, and he made several other
suggestions for nominees if Willis Smith were unavailable.

f A

Washington ignored

Keenan's advice however, and President Truman appointed Higgins.59 Disappointed
with Truman's choice, MacArthur chose the Australian Webb as President of the
Tribunal. Higgins would not only fail to match the rank of the justices from the other
Allied countries in Keenan's opinion, but he would place the United States in an
awkward position less than a month after the prosecution began making its case by
53
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requesting to be relieved of his assignment. Stating that he was assured by the Attorney
General that his responsibilities on the Tribunal would be complete in time to allow him
to return to the Superior Court of Massachusetts and resume his duties as Chief Justice,
Higgins submitted his resignation.60 The Office of Civil Affairs in the War Department
urged him to reconsider his resignation, but ultimately he returned to the United States
and Major General Myron C. Cramer was appointed to replace Higgins.61 He served for
the remainder of the trial.62 If Higgins were in fact unqualified to serve on the tribunal,
Justice Roling felt that Cramer was not much of an improvement and stated that Cramer
was "not a very great authority."63 Trumans' failure to appoint a high ranking justice
and Higgins's disregard for his responsibilities as part of the IMTFE suggest that
Washington did not consider the trial highly important or fully understand the complex
procedure it was undertaking in the trial.
Yuki Takatori offers another view on the Higgins debacle. Takatori described
Higgins as very active politically, civically, and in his community, a man who
accomplished much in life. In 1937 at age 44, Higgins was the youngest man to become
the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court.64 Takatori attributes Keenan's
surprise and anger at the appointment of Higgins to a break down in communication. The
Attorney General's Office sent Keenan a list of possible nominees, which Keenan never
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received.65 Keenan then took it upon himself to nominate Smith and became upset when
his suggestion was ignored. Keenan felt that Higgins lacked the experience necessary to
participate in the trial. Higgins however proved himself capable in the short time he was
in Tokyo and won the respect of the President of the Tribunal William Webb. Webb
even sought advice from Higgins on trial related matters.66 The judges' relationship and
Webb's respect for Higgins was an indication that Higgins was knowledgeable,
competent, and well suited to sit on the bench.
Clearly, Higgins lost interest in the trial by mid-June, and once it was clear that
court proceedings would continue well past the promised six month mark, he began to
consider leaving Tokyo. He felt that a prolonged absence on his part was unfair to
Massachusetts, which was his primary concern. It also appears that Higgins began to
view the trial as a failure and he perhaps did not want to be associated with it. In his
diary, Higgins records the problems he saw with the trial, including the appointment of
Keenan, who he considered a second rate attorney, incompetent American defense
(\1

lawyers, and a personal belief that "the Japanese are being railroaded."

The issues

pointed out by Higgins are some of the most scathing criticisms that arose after the trial.
Takatori believes that Higgins's resignation completely changed the outcome of
the Tokyo Trial. Cramer, Higgins's replacement, was a hanging judge who voted for the
death penalty for nine defendants, seven of whom were hanged. Higgins, a liberal judge
possessing a negative view of the trial, would have most likely voted against the death
penalty, which would have saved at least one defendant from execution. Takatori also
65 Takatori,
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believes Higgins might have written a separate opinion or dissent, which would have
raised serious questions about the goals and legal integrity of the trial.68 The entries in
Higgins's diary raise questions about the real focus of the United States during the trial.
He certainly recorded a feeling that the US was not as invested in the trial as it claimed.
Whatever the reason Higgins chose to resign, whether it was over concern for his home
court or the issues surrounding the trial, Yuma Totani states that he would have been
unable to resign so easily if the United States had attached real importance to the Tokyo
Trial.69
The appointment of American prosecutors to the IPS also indicated the United
States did not necessarily send their most capable to Tokyo. The original staff was
composed of thirty nine Americans who arrived in Tokyo in December 1945. American
defense lawyers were required since Japanese lawyers were unfamiliar with the common
law court procedures used at the trial. In order to provide the defendants with a proper
defense, American attorneys familiar with these practices were necessary.
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As

appointments from other Allied nations trickled in, the IPS grew into a massive
multinational force. At its peak, over five hundred lawyers, stenographers, and clerical
staff worked for the IPS. Not all Allied countries sent teams as large as the United
States', although the large prosecution team could have been another tactic to indicate
strength and perhaps dedication to the cause, since so many American attorneys were
devoted to the trial. Each additional Allied country provided at least one lead prosecutor.
Of the eleven lead prosecutors, Arthur S. Comyns-Carr from the United Kingdom and
Justice Alan J. Mansfield from Australia played the largest role in the IPS next to
68
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Keenan. Comyns-Carr and Mansfield assisted the IPS in completing investigations,
determining defendants, and completing the final draft of the indictment.71 Comyns-Carr,
a former member of the British Parliament, worked along with Mansfield who had
already investigated Japanese war crimes in New Guinea. The appointees from the
remaining Allied Nations were just as impressive.72
In contrast to some of his international colleagues, Keenan did not possess any
knowledge of the history of Asia and was not well versed in international law. Rumored
to be a drunkard, Keenan was flamboyant and controversial, and often worked himself
into a frenzy in the courtroom. Both the prosecution and defense questioned his
appointment. A prosecutor on his own staff stated that Keenan did not measure up to the
job, while Beverly Coleman, chief of the American Defense Counsel for a short time,
stated that Keenan "was a good lawyer, but he was not the man to handle a trial like
this."73 Even many on the American prosecution team admitted that the teams from the
other Allied countries were of a higher caliber.74 The prosecutors from the other Allied
countries were highly experienced, and many had distinguished careers in their home
countries. The high caliber appointments by the other Allied nations as compared to the
United States, coupled with the embarrassment over the resignation of Higgins reflected
poorly on the United States and its commitment to the Tokyo Trial.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENSE
At the Tokyo Trial, there were clear indications of favoritism toward the
prosecution. The defense experienced myriad problems, including translation difficulties
and an inadequate staff. Favoring the prosecution facilitated conviction and punishment
of Japan's major war criminals. While those in charge were punished Japan could focus
on rehabilitating and rebuilding itself to join the global community.
MacArthur took these lack of fairness complaints seriously and handled many
himself since he wanted to create a positive atmosphere for his Occupation Government.
He was particularly concerned about a complaint that the defense counsel had been
established only for propaganda purposes and not actually to accomplish anything during
the trial.75 The defense was well aware of the disadvantages their team faced and felt as
though it existed merely for show, rather than actually to try to prove the innocence of its
clients.
Problems for the defense counsel began early in the trial. On 31 May 1946,
MacArthur received a lengthy memo and eight resignation letters from American
members of the defense team which was at the time composed of 27 attorneys and 42
administrative assistants. Penned by Captain Beverly Coleman, the memo outlined the
major issues facing the defense and complained the defense "is presently without any
organizational connection" and lacking "any official status or recognition the group can
not function administratively nor can vital and essential activities be either undertaken or
accomplished." Coleman decried the lack of organizational structure and claimed to try to
impose order to provide "the Japanese defendants with American lawyers of suitable
experience and qualifications to assure the Japanese defendants proper representation and
75
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adequate defense." Coleman also found fault with the assignment of the defense to the
IMTFE. The IPS fell under the authority of SCAP, and Coleman argued that SCAP
should oversee the defense as well. SCAP insisted the defense should function under the
IMTFE, which refused to accept the defense as an agent of the court. Coleman
concluded by explaining that the present situation would "preclude any effective or
adequate defense of the accused, and further, will bring discredit upon all of the members
of the group, upon the Tribunal, upon the authority which provided these counsel to the
Japanese defendants, and to American lawyers generally." The American attorneys'
resignation letters varied in length but most reflected Coleman's sentiments. The letters
explained they could not "honorably continue voluntarily to be associated with an
enterprise which can not be effectively or properly prosecuted."

7f\

These resignations

indicate that the defense attorneys took their appointments seriously and were willing to
prepare a proper defense for the Japanese suspects. The United States however, in its
attempt to meet its occupation goals was concerned only with appearances and not
necessarily providing the Japanese with a suitable defense. The large contingent of
lawyers would suggest that the United States was fulfilling its promise to provide an
adequate defense for the Japanese defendants. However, in his diary, Justice Higgins
described the "nitwit" lawyers who fought amongst themselves and only sought to use
the trial as a career move and collect a solid paycheck from the US government. Higgins
considered the appointed lawyers to be unskilled and an obstacle to a decent defense.77
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These lawyers challenged Coleman and his authority and caused the rift that led to
Coleman's resignation.
MacArthur replied to each of the resignations personally, urging the attorneys to
reconsider their withdrawal for several reasons. First, he stated that as SCAP, his duties
were to "establish the Tribunal, to promulgate its charter, and to establish the
International Prosecution."78 The organization of the tribunal, of IPS, and the conduct of
the trials were beyond his purview, and after the arraignment of the defendants SCAP's
power was limited to reviewing the case upon its conclusion. MacArthur explained his
only responsibility regarding the defense was to make lawyers available to the suspects
and make arrangements for the defense team's equipment and working and living
quarters. Second, MacArthur argued that the resignations were difficult to justify since
the difficulties broached in the memo and resignation letters were at that point only
speculative since they were submitted only shortly after the trial began. He stated that "it
is believed that until such conditions actually develop, your application is based upon
conjecture and that the prejudice you thereby throw on the entire proceeding is not
warranted at this time."79 Despite MacArthur's intervention, Coleman and the entire
Navy contingent of the defense team followed through on their resignations.80
The problems for the defense did not end with its organizational woes. The
attorneys complained of a shortage of interpreters and assistants, an issue that affected
their ability to prepare their case. While the IPS had 102 translators, the defense counsel
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had three. It faced a shortage of typists and clerks, forcing the defense team to work late
hours and weekends to try to keep up with the paperwork. Defense attorneys such as Ben
Bruce Blakeney, who was bilingual, often worked at translating documents at the expense
of preparing his client's case. Several times the defense attorneys were forced to ask the
court for a recess because they were unprepared to present or move forward with their
a t

case due to equipment and personnel problems.
Favoritism toward the prosecution was also shown during courtroom proceedings.
R. John Pritchard, the senior editor and compiler of the Tokyo War Trial Project, stated
that "much of what they did offer in evidence was rejected by the court for trivial or
specious reasons" and the rulings of the tribunal concerning the provenance of
documents, hearsay, cumulative evidence...deprived the defence of a great deal of
valuable evidence." This is likely due to the bias shown toward the defense by the bench,
particularly in Webb's case. Webb often openly expressed his disgust and contempt
toward the defendants, and as President of the tribunal he determined court proceedings.
The Allied governments offered a great deal of assistance to the prosecution in securing
documents and evidence, but often restricted similar efforts by the defense counsel. Even
though the IMTFE Charter stipulated that the defense would receive assistance, the trial
records support the defense's contentions.82 The length of the trial may have contributed
to this restriction. By the time the defense presented its case, the trial had dragged on
much longer than anticipated and many of the participants had lost interest. In order to
speed up the proceedings, the bench was much stricter on the admission of evidence.
Though the Allies claimed they were unbiased and the IMTFE Charter provided for the
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rights of the accused, the actions of the Allies were hypocritical. The court looked to
rush through the trial and many involved lost interest when the trial dragged on. The
bench constantly favored the prosecution, and the defense faced enormous obstacles in
preparing its case. The United States did not model the democratic principles it hoped to
convey to the Japanese, but rather made a half-hearted attempt to provide an example of
western style justice while preoccupied with Cold War tensions.

THE DEFENDANTS AND THE INDICTMENT
Although all parties were not in place in January 1946, those present participated
in writing the indictment and identifying the Class A defendants, approved by
MacArthur.83 The indictment filed on 29 April 1946 charged twenty-eight Japanese who
had occupied high level government and military posts between 1928 and 1945, as shown
in Table 1. Each defendant had held multiple offices and participated in multiple phases
of the war, allowing the IPS to cover a wide range of atrocities while at the same time
limiting the number of defendants.84 Among the defendants were former members of the
cabinet, the diplomatic corps, the Privy Council, the army general staff, and the Lord
Keeper of the Privy Seal.85 The men who occupied these positions had been responsible
for overseeing POW camps, organizing Japan's educational system, and publishing
propaganda. They had organized the alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy and
planned major military movements, such as the occupations of Manchuria and Korea and
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Solis Horwitz claimed that these defendants were chosen by
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the IPS not only as representatives of high level government and military organizations
during Japan's aggressive phase, but also because they could be charged with crimes
against peace, they held positions of leadership, and their chances for acquittal were
slim.86

Responsibilities
Roles
Former Minister of War and Minister Organized the Japanese
school system along
of Education.
military lines.
Former commander of the Kwantung Ran POW camps in several
Kenji Doihara
Army and member of the Supreme
locations, such as Malaya,
War Council.
Sumatra, Java, and Borneo.
Assisted in staging the Mukden
Published racist
Kingoro
Incident, leading to war with China. propaganda and helped
Hashimoto
sway Japanese public
opinion in support of the
war.
Shunroku Hata
Former Minister of War.
Helped plan Japan's
invasion of China. Hata
commanded troops who
committed atrocities
against Chinese civilians.
Was a well known political
Kiichiro
Held many political positions in the
Hiranuma
Emperor's Cabinet, including
figure in Japan.
Premier and President of the Privy
Council.
Koki Hirota
Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
During his time as Foreign
Premier, and Foreign Minister.
Minister the Rape of
Nanking occurred.
Naoki Hoshino
Former Chief of Financial Affairs,
Played a role in Japan's
Minister without Portfolio, and Chief occupation of Manchuria.
Cabinet Secretary.
Seishiro Itagaki Former Chief of Staff, Minister of
Controlled POW camps in
War, and member of the Supreme
Java, Sumatra, Malaya and
War Council.
Borneo. Soldiers under his
command committed
atrocities against POWs
and civilians.
Table 1: Class A Defendants and their Roles and Responsibilities
Defendant
Sadao Araki
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Defendant
Okinori Kaya

Roles
Former Minister of Finance.

Koichi Kido

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

Heitaro Kimura

Foraier Chief of Staff, Vice Minister
of War and member of the Supreme
War Council.

Kuniaki Koiso

Former Vice Minister of War, Chief
of Staff, Army Commander and
Premier.

Iwane Matsui

Commander of the China
Expeditionary Force.

Yosuke
Matsuoka

Former Foreign Minister.

Jiro Minami

Former Minister of War, member of
the Supreme War Council, and
member of the Privy Council.
Former Director of the Military
Affairs Bureau and Army
Commander.

AkiraMuto

Osami Nagano

Takasumi Oka

Table 1 Continued

Former Navy Minister, Navy Chief
of Staff, and Naval Advisor to the
Emperor.
Former Chief of the Naval Affairs
Bureau and Vice Minister of the
Navy.

Responsibilities
Supported drug trafficking
in China, exploited China's
natural resources.
Kido was close to the
Emperor during the war.
Approved the brutalization
of Allied POWs and was
the field commander in
Burma while the Death
Railway was built.
Koiso was brutal to Korean
civilians during the
Japanese occupation and
was aware of the atrocities
in POW camps during his
time as Premiere.
The troops under Matsui's
command committed
atrocities during the Rape
of Nanking.
Outspoken supporter of
Japan's expansionist
tendencies and organized
the Axis Alliance with
Germany and Italy.
Controlled Korea during
the Japanese occupation.
In charge of troops who
committed atrocities
during the Rape of
Nanking and the Rape of
Manila. Muto also ran
POW camps in Sumatra.
Helped plan the attack on
Pearl Harbor.
Assisted in planning the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Oka's bureau issued orders
for the transportation of
Allied POWs on hellships
and to shoot any survivors
of downed Allied ships.

41

Defendant
Shumei Okawa

Hiroshio
Oshima
Kenryo Sato

Mamoru
Shigemitsu

Shigetaro
Shimada

Toshio Shiratori

Teiichi Suzuki

Shigenori Togo

Hideki Tojo

Yoshijiro
Umezu

able 1 Continued

Responsibilities
Played a role in the
Mukden Incident, and was
an early supporter of the
war.
Former Ambassador to Germany.
Helped create the Axis
Alliance with Germany
and Italy.
Former Chief of the Military Affairs Approved orders on the
treatment of POWs and
Bureau and Army Commander.
civilians who worked on
the Death Railway.
Former Ambassador to China, Great Actually desired an end to
Britain, and the Soviet Union.
the war, but the Soviet
Union insisted on his arrest
as a war criminal.
Authorized the attack on
Former Commander of the China
Fleet, Navy Minister, and member of Pearl Harbor. He also
the Supreme War Council.
commanded naval units
that committed atrocities
against Allied POWs.
Assisted Oshima in
Former Ambassador to Italy and
advisor to the Foreign Minister.
creating the Axis Alliance
with Germany and Italy.
Former Chief of the China Affairs
Played a role in drug
Bureau and political advisor.
trafficking in China and
was aware of the use of
POWs and civilians as
slave labor.
Former Ambassador to Germany and Prior to the attack on Pearl
the Soviet Union.
Harbor, Togo was in
charge of peace
negotiations with the
United States.
Former Chief of Staff, Vice Minister Controlled the Ministries
of War, Minister of War, and
of Foreign Affairs, Home
Premiere.
Affairs, and Education,
allowing him almost
dictatorial rule.

Roles
Did not hold any official government
positions.

Former Vice Minister of War and
Army Chief of Staff.

A well known and feared
leader in Japan and key
member of the militaristic
army clique that assumed
control.
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Only twenty-five of the twenty-eight indicted sat through the trial and received sentences
as Shumei Okawa was declared mentally unfit, and Yosuke Matsuoka and Osami Nagano
died during the trial of tuberculosis and natural causes, respectively.87
The indictment against the 28 Japanese wartime leaders described the conspiracy
between Germany, Italy, and Japan to dominate and exploit the rest of the world and
threaten basic principles of liberty.88 According to the indictment, the defendants took
advantage "of their power and their official positions and their own personal prestige and
influence" and violated international law as well as Japan's treaty obligations.89 All of
the defendants pled not guilty to the charges filed against them, and court proceedings for
the Tokyo Trial finally began on 3 May 1946.
Charges against the defendants were organized into three groups. Group One, or
Class A crimes, contained counts one through thirty-six. These counts cover aggressive
warfare and the execution of conspiracy for military, naval, political, and economic
domination by Japan over various areas of East Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as
well as accounts of aggression against the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, India, the Philippines, the Netherlands, France, and the Soviet
Union. According to Brackman, the main theme of the indictment was the domination of
foreign and domestic policy in Japan by a "criminal militaristic clique."90 Therefore, the
counts in Group One began in 1928 with actions taken by Japan against the Republic of
China, up to the end of the war in 1945 and thus covered all of Japan's actions during that
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time period. This way any actions taken by Japan during those years could be used
during the trial. The attack on Pearl Harbor as well as other attacks on 7 December 1941
in the Pacific were included in this group. The counts in Group One formed the basis for
the Tokyo Trial. Without these charges, the tribunal had no jurisdiction.
Twenty-three of the thirty-six counts charged all of the defendants, while the
remaining counts cited specific defendants for particular actions, such as the attacks on 7
December 1941.91 These thirty-six counts cover ten phases of the war. Some of the
earliest counts cover aggression in Manchuria beginning in 1931, and military aggression
throughout China beginning in 1937. Economic aggression, corruption, and coercion in
China and other parts of Asia were also included. Other phases of the war included
general preparations for war, military control of the Japanese government, the formation
of alliances with Germany and Italy, and aggressive warfare against the United States, the
Soviet Union, the Philippines, Great Britain, and the Netherlands and Portugal.92 The
broad language again allowed the prosecution to easily use any of Japan's actions as
evidence in their case against the defendants. Aggressive warfare charges and the
"brutal" language of the indictment allowed for accusations against the defendants for
perpetrating atrocities in their scheme to dominate East Asia.93 Since aggressive warfare
was considered the most serious war crime, it is logical that the majority of the charges in
the indictment are for crimes against peace.
Since the defendants were the key planners and leaders in maneuvering the
Japanese to war, they were also judged responsible for Japan's wartime atrocities.
Counts 37 to 52 in Group Two covered charges of murder. In the indictment, Group Two
91IMTFE,
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did not directly charge the defendants with committing murder, but of "initiating
unlawful hostilities...unlawfully ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of
Japan to attack the territory, ships and airplanes of the said nations."94 It described the
victims as "both members of the armed forces of the said nations and civilians, as might
happen to be in the places at the times of such attacks."95 Group Two charges included
"ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of Japan" to carry out the attacks on 7
December 1941 at Pearl Harbor, Kota Bahru, Hong Kong and Davao, as well as on the
H.M.S. Petrel.96 The remainder of the accounts in Group Two included charges for
allowing the Rape of Nanking and similar attacks against civilians and POWs in other
locations such as Canton, Hankow, Changsha, Hengyang, Kweilin, Liuchow, Mongolia,
and the territories of the Soviet Union.97 Many of the charges in Group Two repeated the
charges in Group One and would eventually be dismissed by the Tribunal. By the
prosecution's reasoning though, killings that occurred during an illegal war were murder.
It was odd that charges for murder were included in an indictment for an international
military tribunal when the main charge was aggressive warfare and none of the accused
was personally responsible for murder. The IMTFE was the first time that murder had
been prosecuted at the international level.98 Keenan recognized this peculiarity and in a
press statement issued at the time the indictment was lodged stated "it is high time, and
indeed was so before this war began, that the promoters of aggressive, ruthless war and
treaty-breakers should be stripped of the glamour of national heroes and exposed as what
94 IMTFE,
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they really are—plain, ordinary murderers."99 By stating the defendants were really only
murderers, Keenan seemed to imply that murder-which fell under conventional war
crimes or crimes against humanity-was a crime as serious as aggressive warfare. By
likening the defendants to those who faced Class BC charges, Keenan also removed the
heroic status associated with Japan's leaders during the war.
As with the counts in Group Two, the counts in Group Three did not necessarily
charge the defendants with personally committing any war crimes. None of the
defendants in fact were convicted of personally committing war crimes. Group Three
covered conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, charging the defendants
with responsibility for "all acts performed by themselves or by any person in execution"
of a common plan or conspiracy.100 As Japan's wartime leaders, the defendants were
held responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Count 53 and 54 covered the
atrocities committed against Allied POWs. Count 55 charged that the defendants
"deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure
the observances and prevent breaches thereof, and thereby violated the laws of war."101
Events such as the Rape of Nanking and the Rape of Manila fell under this count. The
remainder of the indictment, consisting of several appendices, summarizes the
background information for the events listed in the counts, the ten phases of the war, the
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treaties broken by Japan, and the statements of individual responsibility for crimes as
described in the indictment.102 The indictment was thorough and well planned, and
provided the public with an overview of Japan's actions leading to and during the war.
Since most of the public was unaware of the situation, the indictment served as one of the
first lessons in the reeducation of the Japanese people in the Allied version of World War
II history.

TABOO TOPICS
Perhaps the strongest indication that the Americans had interests other than the
prosecution of Japanese war criminals was their handling of certain aspects of the Tokyo
Trial. The United States avoided several issues during the trial, including questions with
regard to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945
and the Japanese experiments with bacteriological and biological warfare. None of the
Allied nations represented on the Tribunal faced charges for its wartime actions.
Awaya Kentaro describes the Allies as pursing their fact finding mission "half
heartedly."103 Kentaro states the United States impeded the progress of the trial in several
ways, including by its refusal to try Hirohito as a war criminal. The United States also
avoided indicting any of the defendants on charges of bacteriological or biological
warfare. Unit 731, the Japanese organization that focused on developing bacteriological
and biological weapons during the war, carried out experiments on civilians to test their
creations. The Americans were well aware of Unit 731 and its activities during the
Tokyo Trial, but United States' officials chose to withhold this information, in light of
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their own desire to gain the biological warfare technology before the Soviet Union. On 7
February 1947, MacArthur requested instructions from Washington on how to handle a
request by the Soviet prosecutor to interrogate three Japanese connected with
bacteriological warfare research. The Soviet prosecutor requested interviews with
General Ishii, Colonel Kikughi, and Colonel Ota, who were connected with experiments
at the Pingfan Laboratory in Manchuria. The Russians believed the United States would
authorize supplementary bacteriological war crimes trials, for which they were preparing,
but they also admitted an interest in obtaining knowledge about the mass production of
typhus, cholera bacteria, and typhus bearing fleas, foci of the research in Pingfan.
MacArthur's personal opinion was that the Russians would not gain any information not
already known to the United States, but that the United States might gain additional
information from a monitored interrogation by the Soviets.104 The JCS replied on 21
March 1947 with several conditions that would have to be met for MacArthur to allow a
Soviet interview. Competent United States personnel would first interview Colonels
Kikuchi and Ota. If Kikuchi and Ota divulged any information that the Soviets should
not be permitted to learn they would be instructed not to reveal that information to the
Soviets. They would also be instructed not to mention the interview with the United
States. Finally, MacArthur was instructed to make it clear that granting permission for
the interview was an "amiable gesture toward a friendly Government" since the USSR
had no defined interest in alleged war crimes committed by the Japanese against the
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Chinese. Allowing the interview also could not be taken as a precedent and future
requests might not be granted.105
As the situation progressed, the United States obtained statements from Ishii
through "persuasion, exploitation of Japanese fear of USSR, and desire to cooperate with
US." Ishii requested immunity from war crimes charges for himself, his superiors, and
subordinates in exchange for detailed information regarding this research. The United
States expected to gain more detailed information on these topics using the same tactics
against lower ranked Japanese personnel. The Japanese interviewed would also be
informed that the information would not be used as war crimes evidence. On 3 June
1947, the United States requested information concerning possible war crimes evidence
or charges by any of the Allies against Ishii or members his unit. The United States was
particularly concerned with field trials conducted against the Chinese soldiers or research
focusing on the effects of bacteriological warfare on plant life.106 Only three days later,
Alva C. Carpenter, the Chief of Legal Section, replied that "the reports and files of the
Legal Section on Ishii and his co-workers are based on anonymous letters, hearsay
affidavits, and rumors. The Legal Section interrogations, to date, of the numerous
persons concerned with the BW project in China, do not reveal sufficient evidence to
support war crimes charges." Carpenter stated that there were no pending charges against
Ishii, although his superiors were defendants in the Tokyo Trial. Since evidence was not
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sufficient to connect any of the defendants with Ishii's alleged bacteriological warfare
activities, the IPS decided not to pursue the issue.107
The United States did have evidence of Japan's chemical warfare, but withheld it
from the court. Awaya believes that this decision was related to the United States' use of
atomic bombs. He states:
They [the American authorities] avoided it because, should they pursue the case
concerning the Japanese army's poison gas warfare, it was highly probable that the
defense would confute it by citing the American use of atomic bombs. In addition, the
United States intended to conduct chemical warfare in later years, and was afraid of
having its hands tied by setting a legal precedent against chemical warfare under
international law at the Tokyo Trial. The United States abandoned the prosecution for
this reason.108
Awaya's speculation about the United States' intent to conduct chemical warfare in the
future is noteworthy given the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union,
and subsequent American actions in the Vietnam War. Tensions between the United
States and the USSR emerged immediately after World War II, and the American desire
to prevent the Soviets from gaining information on Japanese wartime experiments makes
Awaya's hypothesis plausible. The United States recognized Japan as a potential ally
against the Russians. Master Sergeant Samuel B. Moody, a Bataan Death March and
POW camp survivor, was the only American GI to testify at the Tokyo Trial about the
Bataan Death March. After his testimony, he worked with the war crimes investigation
division. In his memoir, Moody recounts a conversation he had with a Major Radcliffe
after investigating suspected perpetrators at a factory in Nagoya. Radcliffe informed
Moody that "what we really want, what General MacArthur wants, is for the Japs to learn
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democracy. We may have to count on Japan as an ally some day.. .The Russians, that's
our real enemy. They are building every minute. We're trying to forget the last war.
They're busy getting ready for the next one."109 Radcliffe went on to explain to Moody
that after the war the job of the United States was to rebuild Japan because "they won't
bounce back unless we make a conscious effort to help them. And we have to, sergeant,
we have to, if only to help ourselves."110 Radcliffe's statements support Awaya's
hypothesis regarding the United States' plans for future warfare and help to explain the
United States' actions concerning the information on Ishii's experiments.
Justice Roling of the Netherlands commented on the bacteriological warfare
cover-up in 1981. Roling stated, "it is a bitter experience for me to be informed now that
centrally ordered Japanese war criminality of the most disgusting kind was kept secret
from the Court by the U.S. government."111 The United States knew that Americans
were among the victims of bacteriological warfare experiments, but felt that "the value to
U.S. of Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh
the value accruing from war crimes prosecution."

II?

This decision went directly against

the goal of the IMTFE since it granted immunity to men who committed what Justice
Roling called "the gravest war crimes."113 The United States worried about the "remote
possibility" that the Soviet Union might disclose evidence not only of the bacteriological
experiments, but also of the American victims. The cover-up of these experiments and
granting immunity to General Ishii and his men confirm the United States' primary
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interest in preparation for an expected war with the Soviet Union, rather than the goal of
the IMTFE. Attention to emerging Cold War tensions triumphed over punishment for
wartime atrocities.

VERDICTS AND SENTENCES
The trial proceeded much more slowly than anticipated, and the court did not
adjourn until 16 April 1948, with verdicts and sentences delivered in November 1948.
The judgment ran more than 1200 pages and it took President Webb eight days to read it
aloud to the court.114 Much of the judgment summarized Japan's history and
involvement in aggressive warfare against the Allied nations. The verdicts and sentences
comprised only a small part of the document. The judges threw out the bulk of the
charges against the defendants on the grounds of redundancy or lack of evidence. On the
counts that remained, the defendants were charged as "leaders, organizers, instigators, or
accomplices in the formulation of execution of a common plan or conspiracy to wage
wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law," as well as waging
unprovoked aggressive warfare against China and the various other Allied nations.115
The eight counts for which the defendants were convicted fell into the Class A category
concerning aggressive warfare, the main charge facing the accused as they were all
chosen for trial based on their role in planning the war. All of the charges in Group Two,
"Murder," were dropped. From Group Three in the indictment, crimes stood related to
authorizing and/or permitting inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and the defendants
114 John L. Ginn, Sugamo Prison Tokyo: An Account of the Trial and Sentencing ofJapanese War
Criminals in 1948, by a U.S. Participant. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992), 55.
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disregarding their responsibility to prevent war time atrocities.116 Although the
defendants were not believed to have personally committed any wartime atrocities,
several of them were found guilty of possessing knowledge of atrocities and failing to
stop them, as was the case for General Matsui who was in charge during the Rape of
Nanking, indicating that Class B and Class C war crimes were important. The conviction
of Class A defendants for Class BC crimes also upheld the precedent set during the
Yamashita trial in Manila and confirmed that wartime leaders were responsible for the
actions of their subordinates.
All of the twenty-five war criminals were found guilty of at least one charge.
Seven defendants received the death sentence; sixteen faced life imprisonment. Only
Togo and Shigemitsu received lesser sentences, 20 years and seven years in prison,
respectively. The sentences lacked any discernible pattern (see Table 2 below.) Only
two defendants were acquitted on Count 1, the charge for planning aggressive warfare.
The seven sentenced to death were convicted of one of the conventional war crimes
charges—either Count 54 or 55. Matsui, convicted only on Count 55 received the death
penalty. Matsui's death sentence indicated that the Allies viewed conventional war
crimes charges as one of the most serious charges in the indictment. He received the
death sentence for a Class BC crime and was not charged with crimes against peace. In
an example of the inconsistency of the sentences, other defendants who were convicted
on Count 55 in addition to Class A crimes received lighter sentences. Even the other
defendants convicted on the same counts did not receive the same sentence. Togo and
Umezu, for example, were convicted of the same charges yet Togo received twenty years
in prison while Umezu received a life sentence.
116
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Count

1

27

29

31

32

33

35

36

54

55

Sen
tence

Araki

G

G

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

Life

Doihara

G

G

G

G

G

NG

G

G

G

X

Death

Hashimo

G

G

NG

NG

NG

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Hata

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NG

NG

NG

G

Life

Hiranuma

G

G

G

G

G

NG

NG

G

NG

NG

Life

Hirota

G

G

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

NI

NG

G

Death

Hoshino

G

G

G

G

G

NG

NG

NI

NG

NG

Life

Itagaki

G

G

G

G

G

NG

G

G

G

X

Death

Kaya

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Kido

G

G

G

G

G

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

Life

Kimura

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NI

G

G

Death

Koiso

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NG

NG

G

Life

Matsui

NG

NG

NG

NG

NG

NI

NG

NG

NG

G

Death

Minami

G

G

NG

NG

NG

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Muto

G

G

G

G

G

NG

NI

NG

G

G

Death

Oka

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Oshima

G

NG

NG

NG

NG

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Sato

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

to

Table 2: Verdicts and Sentences of Class A War Criminals
G=Guilty, NG=Not Guilty, NI=Not Indicted, X=No findings by IMTFE
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Count

1

27

29

31

32

33

35

36

54

55

Sen
tence

NG

G

G

G

G

G

NG

NI

NG

G

7 yrs.

Shimada

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NI

NG

NG

Life

Shiratori

G

NG

NG

NG

NG

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

Life

Suzuki

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NG

NG

NG

NG

Life

Togo

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NG

NG

NG

20 yrs.

Tojo

G

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NG

G

X

Death

Umezu

G

G

G

G

G

NI

NI

NG

NG

NG

Life

Shigemitsu

Table 2 Continued

Class A war crimes were the focus of the Tokyo Trial and so crimes against peace
should have received the harshest sentences. The IMTFE Judgment supports the gravity
of Count 1. It states "we have come to the conclusion that the charges of conspiracy to
wage aggressive wars have been proven and that these charges are criminal in the highest
degree."117 Six of the seven defendants who received death sentences were convicted of
aggressive warfare and one of the Class BC charges, either Count 54 or 55. The seventh
defendant to receive the death sentence, Matsui, was convicted only of Count 55, a
crimes against humanity charge. If crimes against peace were considered the most
grievous war crimes, it is curious that Matsui was sentenced to death for failing to control
his troops in Nanking. Matusi's sentence seems to suggest that crimes against humanity

117
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were just as important as crimes against peace, though the entire purpose of the tribunal
stated otherwise. It is also possible that Matusi's death sentence was part of the re
education of the public about Japan's wartime actions. Since the events in Nanking were
well known, Matusi's sentence served as a warning against future atrocities. The other
seventeen defendants who were convicted of crimes against peace received lesser
sentences.
Six of the seven defendants sentenced to death were military officials. Hirota, a
former premier and foreign minister, the only civilian who received the death sentence,
"took the fall for Japan's civilian leaders."118 Hirota's conviction caused an outcry from
various factions. Keenan's assistant, Robert Donihi, defense attorney George Fumess,
defendant Shigemitsu, and American defense attorney George Yamaoka all believed
Hirota should have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence, considering his role as a
civilian and his inability to control the military that essentially ran the government.119
Togo, another civilian and the former foreign minister, was convicted on the same counts
as General Umezu and General Suzuki, but he received a lesser sentence than the
Generals. Why the sentences varied is unclear. Piccigallo suggests that the tribunal
considered various peripheral factors in determining each defendant's guilt.120 These
likely included the defendant's official position, his actions during the war, and his
influence over military actions.
After Webb delivered the verdicts and sentences, MacArthur had to review and
approve them. On 24 November 1948 he approved the judgment after meeting with the
Allied Council for Japan for recommendations. The United States, Soviet Union, Great
118 Brackman,
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Britain, China, New Zealand, and the Philippines recommended no changes. The French
representative considered the death penalty unethical and argued that the Allies, based on
their own actions, were not in position to take the moral high ground. The representative
from India, on the basis of Webb's separate opinion, argued for commutation of the death
sentences to life imprisonment. The Netherlands also recommended the commutation of
several sentences, and the representatives from Canada and Australia supported a prison
sentence for Hirota. Although there was disagreement between the officials, MacArthur
1^1

confirmed the sentences.

The seven defendants, including Doihara and Hirota who

were sentenced to death, appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The defendants
argued that the IMTFE was essentially a tribunal of the United States and not an
international tribunal. They claimed that MacArthur had overstepped his authority in
creating the Tribunal, and therefore it was not international in nature. The issue centered
on MacArthur's creation of the Tribunal, while in Nuremberg four powers created the
Tribunal.122 The Supreme Court however, less than three weeks after agreeing to hear the
argument rejected the idea and stated that the Tribunal was in fact international in nature
since MacArthur represented the Allied powers, and therefore an American court had no
authority to alter the judgment or sentences. With the sentences upheld, executions of the
seven men condemned to death were carried out on 23 December 1948.123 The rest of the
defendants remained in prison.
Justice Rflling, in an interview in 1977, expressed his opinion on the execution of
the sentences. Ruling suggested that MacArthur perhaps listened to American public
opinion and attempted to please the American people by following through with the
121
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sentences. Roling's personal speculation was that MacArthur was ordered to uphold the
majority judgment. For propaganda purposes, and to aid in the prevention of future
aggressive wars, Washington might have ordered MacArthur to uphold the sentences.
The American public may also have expected guilty verdicts and sentences for the
leaders who had planned the attack on Pearl Harbor. Roling's opinion seems to be based
on a statement made by MacArthur later to Shigemitsu. Retting quotes MacArthur telling
Shigemitsu: "I was always convinced that you were innocent and that your
condemnation was a mistake."124 Roling stated that the arguments MacArthur needed to
commute Shigemitsu's sentence were in his dissenting opinion, though he did not believe
MacArthur read his or any of the dissenting opinions, especially as he had approved the
sentences very shortly after they were pronounced. People expected the "Supreme
Commander who had established the Tribunal should accept its findings and
judgment."125 MacArthur's adherence to the sentences is noteworthy, especially since
the situation regarding Japan had changed by late 1948. Reduction of the sentences could
have been a gesture of goodwill toward the Japanese. Perhaps the United States thought
it inappropriate to show leniency toward any of Japan's major war criminals, and saved
those acts for the Class BC trials.
The inconsistency of the verdicts and sentences for the Tokyo defendants raises
questions about the decisions. The Judgment did not offer any clues as to how the
sentences were determined, although Webb did point out that no one at Nuremberg
received the death penalty if they were convicted only of crimes against peace, and the
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same principle should be applied to the Japanese.126 Since the tribunal was convened
specifically to try defendants for aggressive warfare, it would seem that Class A crimes
would receive the harshest penalties. By only sentencing defendants who were convicted
of conventional war crimes in addition to crimes against peace (except in the case of
Matsui) the IMTFE did not seem to uphold the great importance of the Class A crime.
Since most defendants convicted on Class A charges received prison sentences, the
sentences overall indicate that conventional war crimes were in fact of great importance
because only defendants convicted on those charges were sentenced to death. Planning
for aggressive warfare alone was not enough to warrant the death penalty.

DISSENTING OPINIONS
Although the majority of the justices supported the judgment, several dissenting
opinions were filed. These opinions were not presented to the court, but were included in
the final record of the trial. Justice Pal, from India, dissented completely from the
majority opinion.127 Justices Bernard (France) and Ruling (the Netherlands) partially
dissented. Justices Jaranilla (Philippines) and Webb concurred, but submitted separate
opinions reflecting their views on specific problems.128 The variety of opinions reflected
the justices' personal beliefs, or disagreements with sentencing and procedural matters.
The dissents and separate opinions reflected the difficulty in reaching agreements in
international tribunals and point to the controversies associated with the Tokyo Trial.
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One of the biggest criticisms of the trial revolved around the idea of conspiracy.
As Richard Minear points out, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were
"of highly uncertain status in international law."129 In order to try suspects for crimes
against peace, the prosecution had to argue that certain international conventions such as
the Kellogg-Briand Pact established the accountability of leaders for actions of their
country in international law. Thus charges of conspiracy were included in the indictment.
Defense lawyer Kenzo Takayanagi argued that conspiracy was a "peculiar product of
English legal history."130 Although Minear criticized the Tokyo Trial, based on his
vantage point from the Vietnam era, his emphasis on the legal debate reflects on the more
important criticisms of the trial. The concept of conspiracy remains a contention that
surrounds the Tokyo Trial. In this instance, Webb and Pal agreed with the critics and felt
that the Tribunal did not have the authority to charge for conspiracy as it did not already
exist under international law. The fact that two of the justices of the trial questioned the
validity of their authority suggests that the Allies were not strict in their interpretation of
law. A loose interpretation of international law and the idea of conspiracy allowed the
tribunal to successfully carry out its responsibility to punish those responsible for waging
aggressive warfare, even if there was no real precedent. A strict interpretation may have
prevented the tribunal from trying the defendants, as the Class A trial required charges of
crimes against peace. Minear also argues that the conspiracy charge allowed the
prosecution to include a spectrum of defendants.131 The conspiracy charge enabled the
Allies to arrest a large number of suspects, many of whom were held for the duration of
the IMTFE but released without trial.
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Minear states the conspiracy charge allowed for relaxed rules of evidence.

The

relaxed rules of evidence clause proved important in both Class A and Class BC trials, as
the Japanese destroyed many official documents prior to the start of the war crimes
investigations. Although the court acted as a model of western style justice systems and
required sufficient evidence to convict a defendant, the relaxed rules of evidence made
the prosecution's task easier and contributed to the ease with which the tribunal could
reach guilty verdicts.
Both Webb and Pal agreed that conspiracy was not a crime under international
law. Webb stated:
It may well be that a naked conspiracy to have recourse to war or to commit a
conventional war crime or crime against humanity should be a crime, but this Tribunal is
not to determine what ought to be law but what is the law. Where a crime is created by
the International Law, this Tribunal may apply a rule of universal application to
determine the range of criminal responsibility; but it has no authority to create a crime of
naked conspiracy based on Anglo-American concepts; nor on what it perceives to be a
common feature of the crime of conspiracy under the various national laws.133
Pal also concluded that "conspiracy by itself was not yet a crime in international life."134
One of the criticisms of the Tokyo Trial was that it was based on ex post facto law, and
the defendants were charged with crimes that had not existed at the time they were
committed. Webb's statement points out the difficulty in translating national legal
concepts over into international law without clear precedents. Many of the issues
included in the dissenting opinions, such as the questions over the conspiracy charge,
mirrored objections made by the defense prior to and during the trial.
Webb detailed his disagreement with the Tribunals' definition of conspiracy,
arguing that the concept of conspiracy adopted had no grounds in international law,
132
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although he recognized that it existed in Anglo-American law. He also disagreed with
the punishments, citing the Nuremberg sentences as a precedent. In Nuremberg several
war criminals convicted of plotting and waging aggressive warfare received life
sentences. Webb urged the IMTFE to do the same. He consistently opposed the death
penalty; the Tokyo Trial was the first time Webb had ever pronounced a death sentence
in his twenty-three years on the bench. Webb's opinion was most sensational in his
conjecture that Hirohito should have been charged as a war criminal.135
Pal's agreement with Webb on the lack of precedent for conspiracy charges in an
international court went further in his disagreement with all of the findings in the
majority opinion and culminated in his dissent that called for the acquittal of each
defendant on all charges. Rather than active conspiracy, Pal believed that Japan had been
driven to its actions by threatening conditions elsewhere in the world, such as the rise of
Communism in China and the Western nations' economic embargoes against Japan. In
his opinion, Japan had been justified in initiating the war to protect itself.136 For the idea
of crimes against peace to have been legitimate, Pal argued, all nations involved would
have to be agree unanimously, and even the victor nations would need to be held
responsible for their actions during the war.137 Maga mentions that Pal asked, in the
name of fairness, that the Allied leaders also be tried or the Tokyo defendants found not
guilty of planning aggressive warfare. This request was refused and Pal continued to
claim the trial was "victor's justice."138
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Pal also argued that Japan was not legally bound by the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907, the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, or any other international agreements
because not all signatories ratified the Fourth Hague Convention, and Japan agreed to
comply with the Prisoner of War Convention only out of good will and was not legally
bound to follow through.139 While Pal admitted that the Japanese had committed
atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war, he did not think the Tokyo Trial dealt
with the actual perpetrators of the crimes. Rather, the people actually responsible for war
crimes were those at the lower levels, such as soldiers in the field or camp guards. Pal
actually praised the work of the tribunals that oversaw the Class BC trials conducted by
the various Allied nations and believed that they were right in holding war crimes trials
because they focused on those who carried out the crimes. He argued that the Tokyo
Tribunal should not have charged the defendants with conventional war crimes as the
accused did not personally commit any atrocities.140 Pal's position supports the
importance of the Class BC trials and their success in trying perpetrators who personally
committed war crimes. It undermines the importance of Class A crimes against peace,
which was the entire basis for the trial. If the defendants were not charged with Class A
crimes, the Tokyo Tribunal had no jurisdiction. According to Pal's logic, the Tokyo
tribunal should not have existed. The prosecution was able also to charge the defendants
with Class BC crimes due to the indictment's wording and the range of time and scope of
events it covered. The indictment focused most heavily on aggressive warfare. Since Pal
believed the defendants were justified in their actions, were innocent of waging
aggressive warfare, and were not personally responsible for committing Class B or Class
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C crimes, he could argue that each defendant should have been acquitted. In the end, Pal
was the only justice who did not sign the Tribunals' Judgment, indicating the depth of his
conviction and severe opposition to the majority opinion. Justices Bernard and Roling
signed only with the understanding that their separate opinions formed part of the
record.141
Justice Jaranilla, in his separate opinion, also disagreed with the sentences, but,
unlike Pal, he felt that the Tribunal was not strict enough in its punishments. Jaranilla
stated that "if any criticism should be made at all against this Tribunal, it is only that the
Tribunal has acted with so much leniency in favor of the accused and has afforded them,
through their counsel, all the opportunity to present any and all pertinent defenses they
had, thus protracting the trial."142 Jaranilla raised no questions about precedents or
international law, but focused on what he believed to be the lenient sentences. As a
Bataan Death March survivor, perhaps he felt that the sentences should be harsher. The
defense questioned Jaranilla's objectivity and feared his bias and asked that he be
removed from the bench since he had "facts, of his own personal knowledge, which may
creep into the case."143 After pointing out that the Tribunal did not have the authority to
overturn MacArthur's appointments, Webb declared that the motion to remove Jaranilla
from the bench did not present clear grounds for a challenge, and it was denied.
The only other justice to call for stricter sentences for three of the defendants was
Justice Roling. ROling thought that the Class A charges were comparable to political
crimes in domestic law, and therefore in accordance with international law. R6ling did
not oppose the death penalty for those accused of conventional war crimes, but he
141

Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 393.
The Japanese on Trial, 29.
143 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 116.
142 Piccigallo,

64

disagreed with giving the death sentence to anyone convicted only of crimes against
peace. Like Webb, he cited Nuremberg in his argument. Roling's opinion that only
conventional war crimes merited the death penalty implies that the Class BC suspects had
committed more severe crimes, since they deserved harsher punishment than those
convicted of crimes against peace. Based on this view, Roling believed that Oka, Sato,
and Shimada should have been found guilty of committing conventional war crimes and
thus sentenced to death, although none of the three was found guilty of Counts 54 or 55,
and each received life imprisonment. He agreed with six of the seven death sentences,
and believed that Hirota, as a diplomat and a civilian, deserved an acquittal. In addition,
ROling thought that four other defendants, Togo, Shigemitsu, Kido, and Hata, should also
have been acquitted.144
Justice Bernard's partial dissent focused on procedural issues. The French justice
opposed the failure to conduct a pretrial inquiry. He concurred with the opinion that the
prosecution had access to more resources than the defense, and therefore was at an
advantage. Like Webb, Bernard also believed that Hirohito should have been tried as a
war criminal.145 He thought the absence of the Emperor was "certainly detrimental to the
defense of the Accused."146 Though he did not argue for any changes in the sentences,
Bernard argued that inclusion of the Emperor in the trial might have helped the
defendants, suggesting that perhaps he thought the outcome of the trial might have been
different had the Emperor been indicted, or at least called as a witness for the defense.
Finally, Bernard pointed out that the judges failed to deliberate aloud and jointly
before reaching their individual decisions. He concluded that "a verdict reached by a
144
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Tribunal after a defective procedure cannot be a valid one."147 Again Bernard seems to
suggest that the outcome of the trial might have been different had in his opinion fair and
proper procedure been followed.
The differences of opinion among the judges illustrate the underlying tensions
surrounding the Tokyo Trial. Although justices should be free from bias, the dissenting
opinions indicated that the eleven justices could not agree on some of the most important
underlying principles or core issues, such as the idea of criminal conspiracy to commit
aggressive war. The justices themselves raised questions about their authority. The
Tokyo Trial only had jurisdiction if defendants were charged with crimes against peace in
addition to conventional war crimes. The purpose of the IMTFE was to try leaders, not
perpetrators. Though dissenting opinions are part of western style justice systems, the
fact that the United States and seven other nations did not submit any further opinion or
dissent while four of their Allies did raised questions about those nations' lack of concern
with respect to trial procedure or international law. The four dissenting justices
represented countries unconcerned with running a smooth Occupation, gaining
information from experiments conducted by the Japanese, or in the case of the United
States, in playing its new role in the postwar world. Instead, they focused on the aspects
of the trial.

CONCLUSION
The Tokyo Trial demonstrated that the Americans were not working solely to
punish Japanese war criminals but sought to ensure a successful Occupation that would
result in a new, democratic Japan willing to ally with the United States against the USSR.
147 Piccigallo,
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The Class BC trials taking place in other areas throughout the Pacific punished war
criminals. They also proved politically useful to the United States as mechanism with
which the Japanese could learn democratic principles. Although the Class A trial received
more attention, the Class BC trials proved to be just as important, if not more important
than the Tokyo Trial.

67

CHAPTER III
CLASS BC WAR CRIMES TRIALS: YOKOHAMA
The Allies faced an enormous task in conducting the Pacific war crimes trials.
Four percent of Allied POW's held by German forces died in captivity. The deaths of
Allied POW's held by Japanese forces was almost seven times higher, at twenty-seven
percent.1 The high percentage of POW deaths, in addition to crimes against civilians in
Japanese occupied territory, resulted in over 2,200 Pacific trials with 5,700 defendants.
Those numbers include only the defendants who were apprehended and tried, and not
those suspects who escaped capture, committed suicide, or were released before they
could be brought to trial.
Most Class BC war crimes trials occurred between 1945 and 1951, and unlike the
Tokyo Trial, the Class BC trials were conducted separately by the individual Allied
nations. Each Allied nation created its own tribunal and ran it according to its own laws.
In one of the few studies that focuses on the BC trials, Philip Piccigallo explains:
Each nation, viewing the trials within its own domestic and international political,
economic, and social context, outlined and followed, within practical limitations, its own
war crimes policy. Put simply, Japanese war crimes trials did not to any great extent
determine the course of any Allied nation's major policies; rather, major policies and
relative factors determined the course of the trials in each nation. This is another way of
saying that Japanese war crimes trials were made to fit into the overall national and
foreign policy objective of each Allied country.2
The Tokyo Trial may have been in the limelight due to its high profile
defendants, but the bulk of the work in punishing war criminals was accomplished by the
Class BC trials. The more numerous BC trials charged war criminals with committing
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atrocities, or for allowing and ordering crimes to be committed. The defendants
represented a wide spectrum of Japanese society. They included soldiers, farmers,
teachers, interpreters, priests, nurses, doctors, government officials, and college
professors.4 The Tokyo defendants allowed, encouraged, or ordered war crimes, while the
BC defendants were present where atrocities were committed and were often accused of
having direct participation, ordering crimes to be committed, or having knowledge of
crimes but failing to put a stop to the them.
The United States tried criminals in three Pacific theater locations: Yokohama,
Shanghai, and Guam. Trials initiated in Manila were soon turned over to the Philippine
government. This chapter focuses on the United States' trials in Yokohama, the site of
the majority of the Class BC trials overseen by the United States.
Unlike the Tokyo Trial, the Class BC trials did not establish many precedents and
attracted little attention outside of Japan.5 Yet the BC trials were more successful in
punishing war criminals than the Class A trial, and they played a more important role in
establishing the global politics as the American Occupation of Japan came to an end and
the United States sought to secure a stable ally against Communism in Asia.

DELEGATION OF POWER FOR CLASS BC TRIBUNALS: YOKOHAMA
The bulk of the American Pacific war crimes trials were held from 1945 to 1949.
Of the 474 Class BC cases tried by Americans, 319 of those trials were conducted at
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Yokohama. The war crimes proceedings at Yokohama included 372 cases, though only
319 came to trial.
The Yokohama commissions were more international than the tribunals
conducted by the other Allied nations due to the fact that they were connected to SCAP.
Other trials did not receive their authority from MacArthur. The Yokohama commissions
were appointed through the regular army channels by SCAP, who represented all the
occupying nations.6 These commissions, appointed on a case by case basis, could include
representatives of several nations, appointed to try cases involving crimes against one or
multiple nations,7 supporting Piccagallo's claim that the Yokohama trials were more
international in nature. The Commanding General, Eight Army also viewed the
proceedings from an international aspect because he, and the reviewing authority, were
created by SCAP and not United States functionaries.8 Granting army authorities the
ability to appoint judges further demonstrated the commitment of the United States to
cooperate with its Allies.
On 5 December 1945, MacArthur granted Lt. General Robert L. Eichelberger, the
commanding general of the US Eighth Army at Yokohama, the authority to create
military commissions for the BC war crimes trials. A lengthy memo to Eichelberger
detailed the rules and regulations concerning the Class BC war crimes trials. The
directive from MacArthur allowed Eichelberger to appoint judges from any Allied nation
to the military commission.
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The memo granted the military commission's jurisdiction over Class A, B, and C
war crimes. While the commissions did have the authority to try war criminals as Class
A offenders, none of the trials at Yokohama charged defendants with crimes against
peace.9 Each commission had at least three members, and unlike the Tokyo Trial, in each
case alternates were appointed. Members could be service personnel in the Army or
Navy, or qualified civilians. A "specially qualified" member of the commission would
be designated as the law member, similar to the President at the Tokyo Tribunal. The law
member had the final say in rulings on the admissibility of evidence.
The document also stated appointees should not be biased by personal interest or
prejudice, and no appointments would be made of individuals who personally
investigated a case or were needed as a witness.10 This was an early contention made by
the defense in the Tokyo Trial, when it was discovered that Justice Jaranilla from the
Philippines was a survivor of the Bataan Death March. The IMTFE ruled that his
experience did not bias him, and he was allowed to sit on the bench. By including the
statement against personal bias or prejudice in tribunal appointments, the Class BC trials
avoided much of the controversy and criticism surrounding the Class A trial. The BC
commissions followed a more stringent set of regulations than the IMTFE. The first trial
at Yokohama, against Tatsuo Tsuchiya, or "Little Glass Eye" in December 1945 allowed
the military commission to put into practice its commitment to avoid bias. In the case of
Tsuchiya, Colonel Joseph H. Ball was relieved of duty as a member of the military
commission when the defense for Tsuchiya objected after learning that Ball was captured
9 Commanding
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in the Philippines, survived the Bataan Death March, and spent three years in a Japanese
POW camp. Ball stated that he "believed himself to be unprejudiced except in so far as
incidents that he himself witnessed."11 However, terse responses to further questioning
case a doubt on his ability to be impartial and Ball was removed from the bench. This
attempt to eliminate possible prejudice provided Tsuchiya a commission that held no bias
based on wartime experiences.

10

The memo detailed the trial procedure, providing nine steps, from reading the
charges and specifications aloud in open court to the commission considering the case in
closed session before announcing the judgment and sentence.13 An additional document
regarding trial proceedings supplemented the 5 December 1945 memo and essentially
provided a script for the trials. Since commission members changed on a case by case
basis, these guidelines ensured that each defendant faced common standards in trials
before a commission at Yokohama. The guidelines began with the procedure for the
commission members' entrance into the courtroom, continued with the swearing in of
court officials, reading of charges, opening statements, questioning of witnesses, and
ended with the closing of the commission for discussion and reading of the verdict.14 The
guidelines also limited the possibility of controversy regarding court policies and
proceedings since each defendant was subject to the same procedure. They ensured that
each trial demonstrated the democratic practices that the United States was determined to
convey to the Japanese for their country's rebuilding. The final section in the 5
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December 1945 memo granted the commissions permission to determine the most
beneficial rules to complete their task, as long as they were not inconsistent with the rules
set by SCAP.15 This paragraph allows some leeway to determine trial procedure, as long
as decisions did not deviate substantially from SCAP orders.
Just as the IMTFE sentences were subject to MacArthur's review before their
execution, the Class BC trial sentences were also subject to review. The memo provides
more detail than the IMTFE Charter regarding sentences. The commission was granted
authority to sentence defendants to death, prison sentences, fines, or any other
punishments the committee deemed appropriate. All sentences were reviewed by the
officer appointed to the commission, who had the ability, like MacArthur in the Class A
trial, to approve, suspend, or reduce the sentences but not to increase their severity.16
Allowing the commanding officer of the US Eighth Army to review sentences of the
Class BC trials lightened MacArthur's workload. MacArthur only had to step in directly
where the accused was sentenced to death.

TRIBUNAL RULINGS, EVIDENCE, AND TRIAL PROCEDURES
Rulings were determined by a majority vote. No less than two thirds of the
commission members had to be present for the vote. The commission was urged to
"confine each trial strictly to a fair, expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or
interference." Most trials at Yokohama lasted several days or weeks. One trial lasted
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only one day. In order to expedite the trials, the Class BC memo, like the IMTFE
Charter, relaxed the rules of evidence stating that "the commission shall apply the rules
of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve
expeditious procedure."17 A major problem arose when the United States demanded
official military documents. The Japanese had destroyed as many official records as
possible to hide evidence of war crimes making the relaxed rules of evidence necessary.
Purposeful destruction of official documents also indicated the Japanese were aware and
fearful of the criminality of their actions and cognizant of the confirmation of their
actions that the records would provide to the occupying authorities.
Evidence was to be admitted if, in the opinion of the commission, it "would be of
assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion
would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man."18 The memo contained
criteria similar to what the IMTFE Charter would later adopt. Evidence included
documents issued by the government or International Red Cross, affidavits, depositions,
diaries, letters, copies of documents, as well as sworn or unsworn statements that
appeared to contain relevant information.19 During the first trial at Yokohama, that of
Tatsuo Tsuchiya, the defense argued against allowing affidavits into evidence. Members
of the commission overruled the objection, stating "the protection of the United States
Constitution and Articles of War was not available to the accused as a Japanese citizen
and a former belligerent."20 The defense argued that affidavits did not allow the suspect
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to face his accuser in court, a right guaranteed to defendants in a US court of law. Likely,
cost, time, and the number of potential witnesses led the commission to deny the
defendant the right to face his accuser. Many Allied prisoners had returned home by the
time the trials began and the cost to transport witnesses to Yokohama would have been
very high.
The memo also allowed for the introduction of evidence from a previous trial if
the accused was charged in a crime involving a military unit or other organization. This
was especially important in the Class BC trials because of the high number of suspects
charged with Class BC crimes and the possibility of trying suspects in multiple cases.
The judgment of previous trials when the defendants were part of the same group would
also "be given full faith and credit" in subsequent trials.21 This decision suggested the
United States' haste to get through the war crimes trials process. The desire to move on
to other, seemingly more pressing issues, such as the signing of a peace treaty with Japan,
may have influenced the agenda. Educating the Japanese people on the actions of their
government and military may also have been a factor in the rapid preparation for the
trials, since most civilians were unaware of wartime atrocities. By showing the Japanese
the conduct of their country during war, the United States may have hoped that they
would be more willing to follow democratic ways, or at least comply with US demands.
The defense was aware of the relaxed rules of evidence, but in some cases the
American defense lawyers still objected to the use of affidavits. In case number 51
Yasushi Kimura, who served as a civilian guard in a POW camp, was charged on ten
counts of abusing American POWs. No POWs testified at his trial, but some submitted
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testimony through affidavits. Kimura's defense lawyer submitted a general objection to
all affidavits on the grounds that the defendant did not have the occasion to cross
examine the person who submitted the affidavit. The commission overruled the objection
and the defense then made specific objections to statements in the affidavits, some of
which were sustained. In several instances, the prosecution and defense lawyers worked
together to reach agreement on which statements should be stricken. The affidavit of
William Rudolph Leibold presented several such opportunities. The defense and
prosecution agreed that paragraphs one and two of the affidavit should be omitted since
they did not mention the defendant specifically and only gave a general overview of
Leibold's personal experience during the war. The prosecution agreed to remove several
other paragraphs described as irrelevant, decisions sustained by the commission.

In

Kimura's case, members of the commission took into consideration what was best for the
defendant. The defense proved that one witness called by the prosecution personally did
not like the suspect. While a commission member attempted to find out whether there
was any "malicious or spiteful feeling" on the part of the witness against the accused, the
defense successfully objected on the grounds that the witness's reasons for not liking the
defendant had no bearing on the war crimes case.23 Although the witnesses' personal
feelings about the defendant were not relevant to the case, allowing the expression of
those feelings in court may have influenced the commission members.
The evidence section also stated, "all purported confessions or statements of the
accused shall be admissible without prior proof that they were voluntarily given, it being
for the commission to determine only the truth or falsity of such confessions or
22
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statements."24 This statement raises questions about the manner in which confessions
were obtained, although the directive included no information regarding this practice.

LEGAL SECTION AND WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION
Although there was a considerable delay before the Class A trial in Tokyo, the
Class BC trials in Yokohama began quickly once the institutional framework was in
place. MacArthur oversaw the war crimes trials and the Legal Section. In order to
investigate and prosecute war criminals, a special staff section of General Headquarters
SCAP was created. Several predecessors to Legal Section existed. The War Crimes
Office of the US War Department was established on 7 October 1944, and the Judge
Advocate's Office opened a War Crimes Branch in the Pacific in April 1945. Two
months later, a War Crimes Investigation Detachment opened in Manila. These offices
investigated reports of war crimes and assisted with evidence collection.25 In October
1945, these offices were turned into the Legal Section and took over the prosecution of
war criminals. Colonel Alva C. Carpenter was appointed Section Chief. It was his
responsibility to advise MacArthur on "general policies and procedures with respect to
war crimes in categories other than the international aspect," or Class BC crimes, as well
as general policies regarding occupation courts and general legal matters.

If*

The Legal

Section had many responsibilities regarding war crimes, including the investigation of
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crimes, preparing cases of alleged war criminals, and maintaining a central registry of all
Japanese war criminals and suspects.27
In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Legal Section was authorized to create
functional divisions. These included Prosecution, Investigation, Law, Criminal Registry
and Administration, Control, Public Relations, and Liaison.

Since the Class BC trials

were daunting the divisions narrowed the focus of those employed in each department.
Prosecution, composed of mostly attorneys, was assigned specific cases to prepare.
Investigation prepared information required for successful prosecution. The Criminal
Registry maintained the records of war crimes in the Pacific. The Liaison Office served
as the link between the Japanese government and Legal Section. Liaison transmitted
demands for documents and other information to the Japanese government on topics such
as POW camps and processed their replies. The Legal Section required constant access
to Japanese military records, controlled by various Japanese Ministries. Liaison routinely
interacted with the Ministries. However, due to the nature of the Occupation, Liaison, as
well as Legal Section, did not always trust nor get along with the Ministries.
Demobilization Ministries, run by the Japanese, controlled the Japanese government, and
SCAP guided the direction of the demobilization. However, since the Japanese were still
essentially running the government, people who had perhaps committed atrocities
continued to work in the Ministries and some were suspected of hampering the
investigations.29 Even taking into account the loss of military records and the occasional
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deception, Legal Section still succeeded in finding evidence of multiple atrocities and in
trying hundreds of suspected war criminals on Class BC charges.
The Japanese had been warned several times prior to the end of the war that war
criminals would be punished. As soon as the Japanese surrendered, preparation for the
trials began. The day Japan surrendered, the government was ordered to provide
complete information on the location of POW camps and the names of all Allied POWs
and civilian prisoners in the camps. To deal with the enormous task of investigating war
crimes and preparing cases for trial, Japan was divided into seven districts, which
paralleled the Japanese army areas. In November 1945, they were ordered to provide a
list of the complete chain of command from the Minister of War to camp commanders.
They were again ordered to provide rosters of all POWs held in camps in Japan and the
Philippines, a list of those who died in the camps, and a roster of all camp personnel, both
civilian and military.30
The Japanese government admitted in November 1945 that they destroyed records
of over 30,000 POWs. The government blamed War Minister Korechika Anami, and
stated that the first order to destroy documents was given on 15 August 1945. The Allies
demanded a list of all destroyed records and were told this could not be provided. Anami
had hoped to conceal the fate of mistreated or murdered POWs. In some instances false
reports were prepared to hide the details of especially gruesome cases. The
Demobilization Ministries provided reports on ninety-four POW camps. Cross checking
statements taken from prisoners during liberation against the list of camps provided by
the Japanese government, Legal Section realized that the location of all POW camps had
not been reported by the Japanese government. Allied investigators located an additional
30
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thirty-three.31 These discoveries testified to the scale of deliberate deception by the
Japanese government. Legal Section dispatched teams to find the unreported camps.
Second Lieutenant William Gill, later promoted to Captain, was part of the Investigation
Division for Legal Section in Japan. In December 1945, Gill, and his Nisei interpreter
Byron Yoshino were part of an investigation team sent to search for unreported POW
camps on Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island. Gill and Yoshino assessed the
conditions at each camp and documented their findings. They also searched
unsuccessfully for records or other documents that might be useful in war crimes trials.
Gill described the process as frustrating, but stated that he and Yoshino were able to
identify several camp personnel suspected of mistreating POWs. Gill's experience with
one of the suspects, a factory supervisor, demonstrates that the Japanese did follow orders
to destroy records in order to cover up war crimes. The suspect freely admitted he had
burned POW records, and after Gill pressed the issue, insisting that the supervisor
perhaps missed some records, the suspect replied "he did a good job at what he was told
to do."32 Aware of the atrocities committed during the war, Gill worked to find the
evidence to bring perpetrators to trial. However, since the United States was determined
to model democratic principles and required evidence of crimes, Gill realized that many
war criminals would escape punishment. He realized that it was "only winners, who
occupied a territory and physically held the offending personnel and their assets, that had
the power to determine what enemy actions would, or would not be prosecuted as war
crimes."33 His critique helps to explain why the United States hesitated to hold trials for
bacteriological warfare experiments. In 1947 Gill was sent to investigate experiments
31
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conducted by Unit 731 in Manchuria. After a lengthy investigation, Gill "was ordered to
stop the investigation and forget the entire affair, because the information was classified
as top secret intelligence instead of war crimes."34 The requirements for evidence to
prosecute suspected war criminals and the knowledge that where evidence did exist, other
war criminals received clemency created a difficult task for investigators. Gill and
Yoshino did contribute to the war crimes effort by uncovering evidence used in the trials,
but wished they could have done more to help the victims. Given the number of records
destroyed, the frustration in searching for evidence to assist the prosecution is easy to
imagine. Gill dedicated his memoir to "those Prisoners of War in Japan, for whom we
came too late—we were so very sorry."35
The war crimes were grouped by type including POW cases, ship transport cases,
Kempei Tai cases, airmen cases, and medical cases. Crimes that did not fit into any of
these categories were assigned to a miscellaneous grouping.36 The Investigation Division
then worked to find evidence to support the prosecution teams. In 1946, Gill was
assigned as the investigations area supervisor of cases involving airmen. Of the 2,700
investigations handled by the Investigation Division, 1,000 involved airmen. These cases
were prominent because airmen were often the victims of brutal treatment in POW
camps. Many were summarily executed. Japanese actions against airmen stemmed from
the Doolittle raid in April of 1942. After the raid, the Japanese Army issued the Enemy
Airman's Act of 1942, which permitted the Japanese to try airmen and hand out death
sentences. These "trials" did not afford the airmen a defense. Often, they were
conducted in Japanese with no translations, and they usually resulted in the beheading of
34 Gill,
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the "defendant."37 The treatment of Allied airmen POWs by the Japanese certainly did
not adhere to international regulations governing the treatment of POWs. The US hoped
that the actions of the Investigation Division provided a contrast, and demonstrated that
democratic countries did not summarily execute prisoners but rather relied on evidence
and proper proceedings. The US provided defendants translations of all court
proceedings. Each suspect was provided with a defense, and evidence was required to
support accusations. In the Class BC trials, the United States provided Japanese suspects
with rights denied to the captured Allied airmen, demonstrating United States' justice and
showcasing Japanese brutality and forcing the Japanese to bend to America's will.
The airmen's cases illustrated the overwhelming amount of work facing the
Investigation Division and Legal Section. In order to reduce the workload, the
Americans decided to treat all crew members from a downed or missing aircraft as one
group, rather than view each airman as a separate case. This greatly reduced the overlap
in investigations as shown in Table 3. By October 1947, 1,000 investigations involving
airmen had been reduced to 475. Investigations of the other categories of war crimes
were considerably fewer. Only the miscellaneous category had a higher number of
investigations than the airmen, with 846 active investigations.

Even with the

consolidation of the cases, the number of investigations of crimes against downed airmen
still made up a high percentage of investigations as compared to other types of atrocities.
The high number of airmen cases could also suggest that the cases were the most
traceable, since the names of crew on downed planes were easily obtained. The brutality
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shown towards Allied airmen may have also contributed to more sensational and highly
publicized cases, leading to a greater push to convict those suspected of these crimes.

Type of War Crime
Airmen
POW Camp Conditions
POW Atrocities
POW Ships
Kempei Tai
Miscellaneous
Table 3: Active War Crimes Investigations

Number of Active Investigations
(October 1947)
475 (reduced from 1,000)
7
111
28
31
846

THE REVIEW PROCESS
Suspects under investigation were held at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, the same prison
that held the Class A defendants. Sugamo housed approximately 2000 indicted persons
and protected witnesses. The United States, following its plan to model a democratic
society for the Japanese, released many of the suspects due to lack of evidence. The
release of prisoners showed leniency on the part of the United States, and also underlined
its superiority, since the processing and release of prisoners implied the United States had
time to investigate all suspects and did not simply rush them through show trials.
Releasing prisoners without indictment may also have served as a method of
intimidation, since only a strong country could decide to release suspects without trial.
Approximately 1,000 of the suspects went through trials at Yokohama. The majority was
Class C criminals. Approximately thirty were charged with Class B crimes.39 Of all the

39 Ginn,

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 33-34, 56.

83

investigations conducted by Legal Section, 371 were prepared for trial. With acquittals,
319 made it to military commissions at Yokohama.
To ensure that the Class BC trials were taken seriously and not rushed through to
punish defendants or extract revenge, a thorough review process was applied in each
case. The cases were reviewed by the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Eighth
Army, and only cases resulting in the death penalty made it to MacArthur's desk. The
lengthy review process aimed to eliminate legal errors that may have allowed for
prejudice to be introduced. The review process ensured each defendant's rights were
protected. By following this process, the military commissions demonstrated fair legal
proceedings, and they also avoided potential controversies by allowing the defendants
legal rights and review. The process made it more difficult to accuse the United States of
conducting unfair show trials, a charge often associated with the Tokyo Trial.
For each trial, the reviewer wrote a synopsis, as well as an opinion and a
recommendation to approve or disapprove the commission's ruling.40 Paul Spurlock, a
member of the Review Branch, described the diligence with which the cases were
reviewed. "Just as in civil courts where some judges have a reputation for being '"hard"'
'and others for being '"easy,"' so have there been some commissions whose sentences
have been more severe than others."41 Spurlock described the review process which took
steps to avoid criticisms and ensure fair punishments of BC criminals. The Review
Branch made sure the SCAP rules were followed, and, considered adherence to the rules
of land warfare, the principles of international law, and any other relevant legal
precedents. Reviewers discussed their cases with each other, carefully weighing any
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suggestions, before turning their synopsis, opinion, and recommendation over to the
Chief Reviewer. The Chief Reviewer checked the information and forwarded it to the
Judge Advocate, Eighth Army. The Judge Advocate made his own detailed study of each
case and added his own suggestions. If he did not agree with the recommendation of the
reviewer, he added his opinion and alternative action sheets to the review. Finally, the
review was forwarded for the Commanding General, Eighth Army, for a final decision.
The Commanding General required the Judge Advocate to answer eleven questions
designed to ensure that each defendant received the same considerations. The questions,
organized into four areas, covered the guilt of the accused, the fairness of the trial, the
sentence and issues of clemency, and the sanity of the suspect at the time of the trial and
alleged offenses. The Commanding General then rendered his opinion. If he approved a
death sentence, the review was sent to the Theater Judge Advocate in Tokyo for
additional review before being sent to Mac Arthur.42
Each of the 319 cases tried at Yokohama went through this thorough process,
which resulted in a number of sentence reductions by Eighth Army Commanding General
Lt. Gen. Eichelberger and later Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. According to Spurlock,
recommendations for reductions of prison sentences were suggested in cases in which the
reviewer found no evidence to support the specifics of guilty verdicts, or where the
sentence was believed to be excessive.43 In some instances, death sentences were
commuted to life in prison or hard labor. Of the 119 death penalty verdicts, seventy
sentences were eventually commuted.44 In instances where the Judge Advocate felt the
sentence was inadequate, nothing could be done since the regulations stipulated that the
42
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severity of sentences could not be increased. The trial of Isojiro Okazaki, Yokohama
case number 48, presented such a situation. Okazaki, charged with willfully and
unlawfully beating and mistreating POWs by slapping and beating them with his fists,
belt, and shoes, was sentenced to two years hard labor. Okazaki pleaded guilty to the two
specifications, stating that he struck the POWs in anger. Sufficient evidence supported
the case, and the defendant was found sane at the time of the trial. The Judge Advocate
found the sentence inadequate stating, "it is not a sentence which is consonant with the
requirements of justice."45 In this instance, the review process could not result in a
change of the sentence, but it did show that the United States followed the regulations it
created for the military commissions. It also protected Okazaki from receiving a more
severe sentence because the Judge Advocate personally felt that the sentence was too
light. Kimura's case also resulted in a conviction that Eichelberger found to be
inadequate. The Commission found Kimura guilty on nine of ten counts, and sentenced
him to five years hard labor. In his review statement, Eichelberger said "the sentence is
inadequate for the offenses of which the accused was found guilty. However, in order
that the accused may not escape punishment, the sentence is approved and will be duly
executed."46 Again, the review process protected the defendant from receiving a harsher
sentence based on one person's opinion.
At the time Spurlock's article was published in May 1950, he stated that the War
Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate section of the Eighth Army was "making a
complete study of all the cases tried to date by the commissions, with the view of
45 Okazaki, Isojiro, Case Synopses from Judge Advocate's Reviews, Yokohama Class B and C War Crimes
Trials.
http://socrates.berkelev.edU/~warcrime/Japan/Yokohama/Reviews/Yokohama Review Okazaki.htm
(accessed 17 January 2012).
46 United States vs. Yasushi Kimura.

86

equalizing by reduction of the sentences of some of the early cases that are unduly severe
by comparison with those of the later cases."47 Presumably, cases that occurred later in
the process had the benefit of a time lapse which allowed for initial anger to cool,
resulting in lighter sentencing in later trials. Recognizing this phenomenon, the United
States took steps to ensure that it accounted for any bias in the earlier trials by reducing
earlier sentences where appropriate. This action again proved fairness as well as leniency
towards former belligerents, and ultimately provided an example of a democratic people
AO

protecting the rights of others to fair trials.

VERDICTS AND SENTENCES
In 319 cases at Yokohama, 996 defendants were tried, with 854 convictions, a
conviction rate of 86%, although the thorough review process altered some of the
sentences. Like the Tokyo Trials, the Class BC verdicts and sentences did not seem to
follow a pattern, other than the tendency for commissions to award harsher sentences
more frequently in the earlier trials.
The verdicts and sentences of the Class BC prisoners brings up the one major
criticism of the Yokohama trials. Given the number of suspects, and the overlap in
accusations and evidence, common trials were introduced at Yokohama. The United
States was not the only ally to hold common trials, but the number of defendants tried
simultaneously was often three to twelve and could rise to fifteen to twenty. In one
instance, forty-six defendants faced trial together. Expedited mass trials prevented
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military commissions from having to re-hear evidence.49 A mass trial saw the highest
number of death sentences awarded at Yokohama. In case number 258, forty six
defendants were tried and forty-one received death sentences. After the review process,
most were commuted to prison terms. Only seven of the forty-one were executed.
Although critics argued that mass trials were unfair, defendants involved in mass
trials were more likely to be acquitted than those who stood trial alone. Larger mass
trials were more common in later cases, as were acquittals. In the first 160 trials, only
nine defendants were acquitted. In the remaining trials, many of which were common
trials, 122 acquittals were handed down. Case number 339 saw twenty-six of forty-four
defendants acquitted.50 The start of mass trials in Yokohama beginning in February 1946
indicated that early on the United States decided that to create peace with Japan, the war
crimes trials would need to end. Seeing the common trials as necessary Piccigallo stated:
SCAP and state department officials discerned relatively early that only through
expedition of the trials might they ever hope to dispose of their enormous burden within a
reasonable time, and thereupon dedicate themselves to concluding a workable, nonpunitive peace treaty with Japan.51
While it was important to punish war criminals, the peace treaty with Japan and threat of
Communism in East Asia were the foremost concern of the United States. Understanding
that the war crimes trials needed to end prior to signing a peace treaty, the United States
used mass trials to expedite the process so it could focus on securing Japan as an ally.
As the site of the largest number of war crimes trials conducted by Americans,
Yokohama was central for the United States in accomplishing its goal of punishing
Japanese war criminals. It also demonstrated that the United States was not simply out
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for revenge, as evidenced by the relatively low number of death sentences that were
handed down and the even smaller number that were actually carried out, as shown in
Table 4 below.

Number of cases tried at Yokohama
Number of defendants
Convictions
Acquittals
Death sentences handed out
Death sentences carried out
Life Imprisonment
41 to 50 years
31 to 40 years
21 to 30 years
16 to 20 years
11 to 15 years
6 to 10 years
5 years or less
Table 4: Yokohama War Crimes Trials Sentences

319
996
854
142
124
51
63
2
32
80
65
92
141
255

The sentences also prove that, unlike at the Tokyo Trial, defendants were not
chosen because their chances of acquittal were slim. Defendants in the Class BC trials
were acquitted and their sentences were reduced, neither of which happened for the
Tokyo defendants. The more rigorous review process, the stricter guidelines, and the
focus on actual perpetrators of atrocities made the Class BC trials much more successful
than the Tokyo Trial in accomplishing the goals set out in the Potsdam Declaration.

PRAISE FOR AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNSEL
The defendants and other contemporaries often praised the American defense
lawyers for their hard work on behalf of their Japanese clients. One contemporary stated

that the behavior of the American defense lawyers demonstrated, "how seriously defense
counsel took their duties, and how intensely they represented the interests of their former
enemies." Rear Admiral John D. Murphy stated that "these American defense counsel
ably [sic] carried out their defense duties with initiative, courage and devotion to their
professional obligation to exert every legal effort in behalf of the accused."52 Spurlock
stated that the Japanese defendants at first did not trust the American defense lawyers and
expected only a token defense. However, by March 1946, "the opposite was true. Word
had got around that the American advisory defense counsel were performing their task
conscientiously and were effectively presenting the position of the accused to the War
Crimes Commission." Spurlock went on to describe how the accused often sent letters of
gratitude to their counsel, or sent family members to the War Crimes Commission to pay
their respects, no matter the verdict One former Japanese major stated in his letter that
he intended to serve his term and upon completion of his sentence would be like other
Japanese who would "spend the rest of their lives teaching Japanese children the true
meaning of democratic justice as it was known under the Stars and Stripes."53
Other letters expressed gratitude for commuted sentences. Suehara Kitamura,
originally sentenced to death, sent thanks to his defense counsel, Mr. Glasser on 6
January 1950. Apologizing for the delay in sending the letter due to lack of a proper
address, Kitamura expressed his "sincerest gratitude for your cordial and endeadorous
[sic] effort in obtaining the commutation of my sentence, imposed upon me as a result of
my trial."54 Kitamura seemed very sincere in his thanks, further stating:
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Very happy that I can express my gratitude for your kindness you have shown to
me during the whole period of my session and subsequently for obtaining the
commutation of my sentence. Unless you did not exert your effort in saving my life, I
might have already been executed. Therefore I, at this very moment am trying to express
my heartiest and sincerest appreciation for what you have respectably done on my behalf,
saving my life.. .1 owe you very much. I will remember your supreme and honorable
conduct throughout my life.55
Kitamura concluded his letter by assuring Mr. Glasser that he was fulfilling his sentence
faithfully, and believed he would eventually be freed and reunited with his family.
The praise for the American defense counsel, especially from the suspects
indicated that those involved did take seriously their role concerning the Class BC
criminals, even though they were considered "small fry" compared to the Tokyo
defendants. The defendants did not express a sense of "victim's justice," a charge lodged
against the IMTFE, especially with respect to the inclusion of a judge from the
Philippines. It is possible that everyone who expressed their thanks toward their defense
counsel was not as sincere as Kitamura appeared. Some prisoners may have hoped for
special treatment, early release, or to prove their reform to American captors. The letters
indicated the defendants recognized the trial provided an opportunity to defend
themselves, a chance that was often denied to Allied POWs. The trials also allowed the
hundreds of Japanese defendants the chance to observe western justice and democracy in
action.

CONCLUSION
One of the goals of the IMTFE may have been to demonstrate democratic
principles to the Japanese, but the lesser BC trials actually provided the better example,
since they followed more rigorous judicial standards. The stricter regulations in the
55
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December 1945 memo better demonstrated western trial proceedings than the IMTFE,
and the review process protected defendants from trial error. Class BC suspects were
exposed to American models of democracy for an extended period, as the Class BC trials
occurred over a longer time period than the Tokyo Trial. The Class BC prisoners proved,
in their campaigns for release, that they had learned and adopted democratic principles.
Though the period allotted for war crimes trials ended before all suspects were tried, the
Eighth Army at Yokohama remained focused on its goal of providing fair trials, adhering
to rigorous policies both during and after the Class BC trials. The United States' efforts
to avoid bias in the trials helped to deflect the criticisms that surrounded the Tokyo Trial.
Ultimately, the Class BC Trials served as a vehicle for the United States to model western
style justice and democracy and demonstrate leniency and superiority to prove the
strength of the United States not only to the country it occupied, but also to its Allies and
the Soviet Union. This demonstration of power was critical given the tense global
political scene, and the United States continued to use the Class BC trials to showcase its
strength by ending the trials and pushing for a peace treaty.

CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF THE CLASS BC TRIALS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
As tensions mounted between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late
1940s and early 1950s, the United States decided to end the war crimes trials in the
Pacific. With the end of the Occupation looming in 1951, the United States was eager to
finish the war crimes trials and sign a peace agreement with Japan. In order to ensure
that Japan sided with the United States against the Soviet Union, the United States sought
to end the Class BC war crimes trials before the peace treaty was signed as a sign of good
faith and to demonstrate that the United States had put the events of the war behind it and
was focused on the future. Ending the trials also meant that Japan's debt had been
assessed and its people had paid for war time atrocities and could focus on the future.
The United States and Japan signed the peace treaty in 1951, and Japan regained
its sovereignty and became the stable ally in East Asia that the United States hoped for.
The attitude of the United States towards Japan changed rapidly after the end of the war.
In September 1945, MacArthur stated, "Japan will never again become a world power."
He also reported that the Allies would not provide Japan with any supplies or relief
during the winter, and that the Potsdam Declaration terms (including the war crimes
trials) would be "enforced to the letter."1 He predicted an Occupation that would take
"many years." One year later, he described Japan as caught in an ideological conflict, a
country that could be "either a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard
for war." By March 1947, MacArthur began discussing peace treaty options claiming

1 Hugh Baillie, "M'Arthur Declares Japan Ended As A Great Power; Orders Doihara Arrested," New York
Times, September 22,1945.
2 "M'Arthur Worried By Tokyo Dilemma," New York Times, September 2, 1946.
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that the framework for democracy had been established in Japan.3 In August 1947,
MacArthur returned control to the Tokyo government and assumed a role of "protection
and friendly guidance rather than to continue to enact the role of an occupying army."4
This development was essentially a "peace without a peace treaty." Concerns arose that
the policy might anger Pacific allies including China and Korea. However, since those
nations did not contribute money or manpower to the Occupation, the United States made
the final policy decisions.5 On 2 March 1949, MacArthur pledged to defend Japan in
case of attack, and described Japan as the "Switzerland" of the Pacific.6 He continued to
push for a peace treaty throughout 1949, arguing that the Occupation goals had been
achieved in 1947. MacArthur's attitude towards Japan highlighted the rapidly rising
tensions between the United States and Soviet Union. The United States' willingness to
alienate its Allies during the Occupation also suggests confidence on its part and the
importance of East Asia in the fight against Communism.
The issue of the peace treaty also created tensions within the United States,
particularly between the State Department and the Department of Defense. At a meeting
on 24 April 1950, the State Department argued that a peace treaty was essential, while the
Department of Defense countered that a peace agreement could provoke the USSR.7 In
his memoirs, policy advisor and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan
stated that he believed the USSR orchestrated the attack on Korea due to the discussion
of a peace treaty between Japan and the United States. This statement appears to support

3 "Transcript
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1947.
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5 Parrott, "Occupation Goal In Japan Held Won," New York Times, August 7, 1949.
6 "M'Arthur Pledges Defense Of Japan," New York Times, March 2, 1949.
7 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), 251.

the Department of Defense's stance on the peace treaty, but as Richard B. Finn points out
Q

in Winners in Peace the timing poses a problem. While some, like MacArthur, pushed
for a peace treaty, in June 1950 the United States had not made a definite decision. The
outbreak of the Korean War changed the situation and led MacArthur to order the limited
rearmament of Japan. Due to their distrust of Japan, the United States' Pacific Allies
including Australia were opposed to rearmament. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had
also opposed Japan's rearmament in favor of economic recovery. John Foster Dulles, the
principal negotiator for the peace treaty, hoped the Korean War would make the Japanese
aware of their responsibilities as a nation of the free world.9 MacArthur expressed a
similar viewpoint in December 1950, when he stated that it was Japan's duty to "join the
free nations and mount force to repel force." He believed that after the treaty Japan
would "exercise a profound influence upon the course of destiny in Asia."10 The Korean
War helped persuade Japan to rearm and also highlighted the United States' need for a
stable ally in East Asia. While tensions remained between the Allies in the Pacific, it
helped to convince some Allies that a peace treaty was needed. Perhaps most importantly
it was a clear example of the threat posed by Communism.
In a letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida on 20 August 1951, only a few
weeks before the treaty was signed, MacArthur wrote "Japan will reassume a position of
dignity and equality within the family of nations and take a firm and invincible stand with
the free world to repel those evil forces of international Communist tyranny which seek
covertly or by force of arms to destroy freedom."11 His comments, a far cry from those

8

Finn, Winners in Peace, 241.
Finn, Winners in Peace, 270.
10 "MacArthur Says Red Threat May Force Japan to Rearm," New York Times, December 31, 1950.
11 "Key Japanese Role Seen By M'Arthur," New York Times, August 24, 1951.

9

95

made just after the war, reflected Mac Arthur's change in opinion regarding Japan and
demonstrated the shift in the United States' focus to the containment of Communism.
The United States pursued Japan as an ally in the fight against communism. Ending the
war crimes trials was crucial to closing the chapter of the war and proceeding to address
United States' concerns in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

THE END OF THE TRIALS AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY
By January 1949, the United States began to take steps to end the war crimes
trials. A message to the Commander in Chief, Far East dated 29 January 1949 ordered
that no more Class A trials take place, and if possible investigations for Class BC trials be
completed by 31 March 1949, with trials concluding before 30 September 1949.12 At
Yokohama, the trials ended in October 1949.
Peace with Japan and the end of the Occupation presented challenges to the
United States. The United States strove for "maximum and exclusive control over
potentially dangerous allies," primarily the Soviet Union.13 The United States recognized
that Japan was the only country in East Asia that had the potential to gain great power
status. The United States had no allies in East Asia during or immediately after World
War II and, therefore, sought to "win Japan" as an ally against Communism.14 At the
same time, the United States wanted to refrain from any agreements that would require its
involvement in unwanted wars in the region. In order to avoid wartime obligations, the
United States opted to create a bilateral alliance with Japan that would ultimately allow it
12 Commander
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to "rebuild the country on an anticommunist bulwark." George Kennan described Japan
as "the key to Asia, just as Germany was the key to Europe."15 The peace treaty then was
an important component of American strategy in the post war world.
The peace treaty signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 by forty eight
countries demonstrated unity among the Allied nations. It also ensured Japan's
adherence to anti-communism, a stance the United States had worked to cultivate since
the end of the war. Japan renounced all claims to former territories including Korea and
Formosa, and agreed to enter into negotiations with Allied nations on various topics such
as fishing rights, commercial interests, and reparations.16 In return, Japan received full
sovereignty, and the American occupation ended.
The treaty however placed Japan in a difficult position within East Asia and
showed the United States as a country driven to contain Communism without much
regard for its Allies and their concerns. Among the forty eight signatories to the treaty,
the Soviet Union and China were absent. Therefore, Japan remained, technically, in a
state of war against those two countries.17 Japanese rearmament brought complaints from
US Allies including Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. American assistance to
Japan led those countries to complain that the United States treated its former enemy
better than its old, steadfast friends.18 Even the principal ally of the United States, Great
Britain, disagreed with aspects of the treaty. John Foster Dulles did not invite the
Chinese Nationalists to the peace conference. The United States ignored Britain's
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opposition to this, straining Anglo-American relations to secure an agreement that would
"almost inevitably lead Japan to align herself with the United States."19
Even with the objections of close Allies, the Communist threat, and possibility of
a renewed war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States still signed the
peace treaty. This created a co-dependent situation in East Asia. Japan needed protection
and support from the United States, especially while rearming itself, and the United
States needed the cooperation of Japan to face the Communist threat in the region.20 It is
interesting though, that the United States sought to sign a treaty and end the Occupation
when Japan was still in a weakened position, especially in the face of the objections of its
Allies. Fear of a prolonged Occupation may have played a role in the decision to sign the
treaty. MacArthur warned that a prolonged Occupation would prevent genuine
reconciliation with Japan.21 While the Japanese cooperated with Occupation forces, the
potential for rebellion existed. Exasperation with continued orders from Americans could
have allowed anti-American influences, proliferated by the Communists, to spread.

The

United States perhaps thought it best to proceed with the peace treaty rather than risk the
Soviet Union gaining a foothold in Japan by provoking anti-American feelings. It was
also best not to excite any anti-American feelings in Japan while the Korean War was
being fought, since Japanese Communists hoped that their position in Japan would be
strengthened by a North Korean victory. Yoshida and Emperor Hirohito expressed their
confidence in an American victory in the conflict.
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treaty by proving Japan to be a cooperative partner in the fight against Communism,
Yoshida agreed to limited rearmament of Japan.
The attitude of the United States in signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty
reflected the continuation of the pragmatic, goal oriented policy toward Japan. Since the
end of the war, during the Occupation, and during the war crimes trials, the United States
strove to obtain an ally in East Asia. Although the peace treaty created potential for
problems down the road, it was signed to secure Japan's friendship and create
dependency on the United States and was touted as a "great demonstration of Allied
unity."24 The Soviet Union and Communist China's objections to the treaty were
ignored, and the United States pursued its own path. The treaty demonstrated that the
United States' ambitions during the Occupation process had come to fruition, and with
Japan as an ally the United States could focus on containing Communism in the region.

PROTESTS AGAINST THE EARLY RELEASE OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS
Prior to the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on 7 March 1950,
MacArthur established a parole board in Tokyo, granting it authorization to reduce the
prison sentences of Japanese war criminals. A memo to MacArthur described the Board
of Parole as an opportunity for convicted Japanese war criminals to demonstrate that they
had served "well and orderly their sentences in prison and rehabilitate themselves
physically, morally, economically, and socially, thus enabling them to return to, and
become again worthy members of human society," which was "in full accord with the
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principles of modern penology."25 As in the Class BC trials, the process of parole for
each prisoner followed a system that allowed for fair treatment and the possibility of
parole for each prisoner. Circular No. 5 established the uniform system for Japanese war
criminals and established policies for awarding confinement credit, good time credit, and
parole. Confinement credit deducted any time served as a suspect or a prisoner from a
prisoner's sentence. Good time credit, which was not applicable to those sentenced to
life imprisonment, allowed those who "faithfully observed all of the rules and regulations
at the place or places in which he is or has been confined and has not been subjected to
disciplinary punishment" to receive a reduction in his sentence. The longer a prisoner's
sentence, the more days he was eligible to receive per month for good behavior. Those
sentenced for six months to one year could receive five days each month for good
behavior, while those sentenced to ten years or more were eligible to receive ten days a
month off their sentence. It was also possible to restore good time credit to a prisoner's
sentence if he violated prison rules. War criminals who observed all the rules and
regulations became eligible for parole. The board considered several factors when
verifying the eligibility of prisoners for parole, including the record and facts of the trial,
the behavior, attitude, and work record of the prisoner, age, physical and mental
condition, as well as the financial status of his family. The Circular described other issues
relating to the release of war criminals, such as actions allowed by the Board, supervision
of parolees, and the revocation of parole.
Allowing the early release of war criminals continued to promote the sense of the
United States' goodwill towards the Japanese. MacArthur's decision to create a parole
25
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board however led to a backlash from the Soviet Union, which claimed MacArthur had
violated the charter of the IMTFE as well as the Far East Commission directive of 3 April
1946 that required consultation among members of the FEC prior to issuing directives.
The United States countered that MacArthur, as SCAP, was the "sole executive authority
for the Allied Powers in Japan" and had "the responsibility for the various matters
pertaining to the execution of the sentences of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, including the granting of parole to war criminals tried by that court." Since the
Soviet Union was involved in the IMTFE, its anger focused on the release of Class A
prisoners, namely Shigemitsu, Hiranuma, and Araki. The United States government
stated that MacArthur's actions conformed to the agreements cited by the Soviet Union,
and were "in accord with enlightened practice in various countries with respect to the
treatment of convicted criminals."27 Granting early release of convicted criminals of
Class A and Class BC crimes was simply another way to demonstrate the "enlightened"
practices of democratic countries. It also placed the United States in a favorable light
compared to the Soviet Union, which sought to keep remaining prisoners in custody.
The United States postponed sending a formal reply to the Soviet Union regarding
the early release complaint for several weeks. In their response in early June of 1950, the
United States reiterated MacArthur's authority to parole Japanese war criminals and
claimed the Soviet Union was "guilty of a fundamental error if it confused parole with a
change in the sentence imposed by the military tribunal." The State Department went on
to define parole for the Soviet Union as permission for a "convicted criminal to serve part
of his sentence outside of prison under certain conditions and controls subject to being
returned to prison for serving the remainder of the sentence if the conditions of parole are
27 Walter
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violated." The United States government chastised the Soviet Union for addressing their
original communication to the United States and not to the FEC, since the questions it
raised fell under the FEC's jurisdiction.
The situation regarding Japanese war criminals' parole highlights the tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The early release of war criminals led
the Soviet Union to accuse the United States of aggressive policies in Asia and an attempt
to remilitarize Japan. An article appearing in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia described the
policy of parole as reflecting "the whole aggressive character of American policy, in the
East as well as the West, preparatory to unleashing a new war."29 The Soviet Union
likely viewed the release of prisoners as part of the United States' process of
remilitarization and therefore a threat toward Communism in East Asia. This accusation
did not deter the United States from its plan for the early release of convicted war
criminals, and by 1958 the last war criminals were released. The strong-willed US
response demonstrated American power to the Soviet Union and to Japan as well, which
would realize it was aligning with the superior ally.
The last criminals to be released were ten Class A prisoners: Araki, Hata,
Hoshino, Kaya, Kido, Oka, Oshima, Sato, Shimada, and Suzuki. These ten, who had
received life sentences from the IMTFE, were set free after Premier Nobusuke Kishi
visited Washington in 1957 and requested clemency. Following the San Francisco Peace
Treaty's stipulation that clemency could only be granted after consulting the majority of
the governments involved in the IMTFE, the United States discussed the request with
Great Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
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and Pakistan. Since the Soviet Union, China, and India did not sign the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, they were not consulted. The various governments agreed to the request,
and Japanese war criminals' parole was effected.30 For the Class BC prisoners, tried by
US military commissions, only US approval was needed.

DEMONSTRATIONS OF WESTERN STYLE JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY
With trial procedures clearly detailed, the military commissions were in a position
to demonstrate the Western justice system and the principles of democracy for the
Japanese. Modeling these ideas was a main goal of the Occupation and the trials
provided the perfect vehicle. However, the Americans stationed at Sugamo Prison also
demonstrated principles they hoped the Japanese would adopt. Yoshio Kodama, a Class
A suspect held at Sugamo Prison, who was released without trial, describes the American
GI's stationed at Sugamo in a positive manner. American soldiers displayed courtesy and
consideration towards the Japanese prisoners, the opposite of what Kodama expected.
Kodama described a situation in which he had to carry a heavy load. He stated Japanese
prison guards would have yelled at him for having difficulty, but the American guards
found people to assist Kodama in his task.31 The prisoners were also allowed to observe
traditional Japanese holidays and informed of major events occurring within their
families. In Kodama's case, he was informed of the birth of his daughter, and was even
given assistance in choosing her name, something he says would not have occurred in a
Japanese run prison.32
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At one point during the summer, Kodama took a bucket of water to the exercise
yard to try to settle the dust and create a more pleasant atmosphere. An American MP,
noticing his actions, said it was not fair for one person to take on the task, and suggested
a rotation system. Kodama thought that the attitude of the MP reflected a "real sense of
democracy" and the fact that a common soldier possessed such a sense of justice should
be a lesson to everyone.33 Kodama also described American interrogators as polite and
sticking to questions of fact, even when an interrogation lasted for several hours.34
Kodama's description shows that Japanese prisoners noted the actions and attitudes of
their American captors. At the same time, including statements in his diary praising
American soldiers was most likely beneficial to Kodama. Such statements demonstrated
a respect for the occupying authorities. They also promoted the sense of Kodama's
rehabilitation and desire to learn the democratic ways of the United States, a good
attitude to adopt during the Occupation. Kodama's diary did not always praise the
United States so highly, but these comments were nonetheless self-serving to some
extent.
Kodama said that Class C prisoners did not necessarily receive the same polite
interrogations as Class A suspects. A Class C suspect described a prosecutor making
threatening gestures, something Kodama and the other Class A suspects did not
experience. The Americans though, according to Kodama, conducted more humane trials
i f

than the British and allowed suspects to have their say in a formal trial.

His opinion

though, must be carefully scrutinized. Since the United States was in charge of the
Occupation and held the greatest power, it was in Kodama's best interest to support the
33
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Americans, especially once they began releasing Class A suspects without trial. Critics
argued the British trials were too harsh and decried the treatment and sentencing of
suspects. Public protests were held against the British military commissions for
sentencing suspects to death in cases where they accused had not been proven guilty of
murder. Piccigallo however, states that the British war crimes trials were "conducted
with admirable seriousness and care" and the British legal officers "performed admirably,
evincing a generally high standard of competence and dedication."36 Kodama relied on
talk amongst the prisoners to make his claim concerning British brutality. He had no
interactions with the British would not have felt the need to speak so positively about
them as he did about the Americans.
The war crimes suspects of all three classes had many opportunities at Sugamo to
mingle and share their opinions. Kodama's diary offers insight into the attitudes of
suspects about the Class C trials. Many prisoners seemed to think the trials were an
empty formality, although Kodama believed this attitude was due to the fact that many
suspects claimed to be innocent. Another Class C suspect, however, said the trials were
fair, and the men deserved their sentences. An acquitted Class C suspect also believed
that most people deserved their accusations, and also described the trials as fair and the
investigations as thorough.37 Sandra Wilson, one of the few scholars who examines the
Class BC criminals, describes the writings of the BC prisoners wherein they make claims
of unfair treatment. One prisoner, "Sergeant Akagi" stated that BC prisoners were given
less food than other prisoners.
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Sasakawa described the food shortage as a result of the unfair distribution of food by the
prisoners themselves, as well as the greedy appetites of the "senior prisoners."

Like

Kodama's memoir, Sasakawa's must be carefully scrutinized, although for different
reasons. Unlike Kodama, Sasakawa hoped to be imprisoned and appeared to be on a self
prescribed mission to "explain without hesitation that Japan did not wage a war of
aggression." Sasakawa believed that he alone had "the confidence to convince the people
of the world."40 He did however, offer some insight to the Class BC prisoners.
Sasakawa described the POW prisoners as afraid of interrogations, because they were
nervous "that their criminal deeds would come to light."41 His opinion of the trials was
often negative and he believed the United States sought revenge through the trials. His
self-righteous diary offered a great deal of advice to the United States on how to handle
the trials, the Occupation in general, and reasons for fighting Communism.
Kodama did not believe the war crimes trials necessarily benefitted the United
States, and his opinion of the trials evolves throughout his diary. He presents an overall
picture of life in Sugamo and an admiration for the attitudes and actions of the American
soldiers. He also makes it clear that American GI's were committed to modeling
appropriate behaviors for the Japanese prisoners and those behaviors were noticed by the
war crimes suspects. Some of the Class BC prisoners at Sugamo displayed democratic
behaviors themselves, hoping to prove that some Japanese were adopting democratic
attitudes and principles.
The writings by BC prisoners Wilson studied, as well as the memoirs by Kodama
and Sasakawa offer a mixed assessment of life in Sugamo Prison. Unfair situations
39 Sasakawa,

Sugamo Diary, 80-82.
Sugamo Diary, 80.
41 Sasakawa, Sugamo Diary, 45.

40 Sasakawa,
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described by some prisoners existed alongside the democratic or sympathetic situations
Kodama described. Some suspects were wrongly accused and held in prison, while
others had committed crimes and had reason to fear the interrogations Sasakawa
described. The writings were most likely geared towards creating sympathy for the
author, especially those articles penned by Class BC prisoners who wished to make clear
that they were just following orders and were therefore not guilty of committing war
crimes. Memoirs by Class A prisoners such as Kodama and Sasakawa have been
translated into English, and these works tend to reflect more positively on the United
States. Diaries of Class BC prisoners, such as those used by Wilson have not been
translated. The works available to English audiences indicate within Sugamo Prison
various attitudes were exhibited, but overall, the Americans modeled democratic
principles.

CLASS BC PRISONERS DEMONSTRATE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
Since the Class BC trials spanned a longer time frame than the Class A trial those
prisoners were exposed to American Occupation officials longer than the Class A
suspects. There were far more Class BC detainees than Class A detainees, which resulted
in a higher number of BC prisoners who learned and practiced, at least to some extent,
the democratic principles the United States had hoped to inculcate.
Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty restored Japan's sovereignty, it included
a clause concerning condemned war criminals. Article 11 stated that the sentences of
convicted Class BC war criminals could only be commuted by (or with the consent of)
the prosecuting country. The article was surprising, since the Americans began a parole
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system in 1950 to release prisoners. In 1952, China released its prisoners in Sugamo
under general amnesty. Since many war criminals had been released, further clemency
was expected, and Article 11 withheld the right to grant clemency from the Japanese
government. This did not deter the imprisoned war criminals, as they petitioned the
Japanese government "to take up their cause, insisting that the government should cease
to subordinate itself to the victors in the Second World War."42 The prisoners' call to
remove Japan from what they viewed as a position of subordination to the United States
suggests that some Japanese were not happy with the situation in which they found
themselves and wished the government would adopt a stronger role in the post war world.
While the Class BC prisoners may not have agreed with the relationship between Japan
and the United States after they signed the treaty, the prisoners used American values
such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press to accomplish their goal of
encouraging the government to distance itself from the United States.
The Japanese government did not object to Article 11 of the peace treaty which
caused extensive prisoner frustration at the time the peace treaty was signed. In March
1952, the prisoners formed a committee to lobby for their release and create public
sympathy. The general public appeared to support the inmates, as millions of Japanese
citizens signed a petition for their release, and many people, including high profile
entertainers and politicians visited the prison to show their support. Visits by politicians
showed that the government changed its stance. Prisoners were able to meet with the
politicians, including cabinet ministers and the Chief Justice of the Foreign Ministry, to
make their cases heard. These meetings allowed the prisoners to be directly involved in
politics and fight for release, but it also demonstrated that the Japanese government was
42
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invested in the issue.43 This was a development the United States needed to consider. As
early as August 1952, an article published in the Japanese Bar Association journal
warned that the continued retention of convicted war criminals would endanger the
treaty. It also warned that retention could turn the inmates into heroes, since public
opinion was moving in favor of the prisoners' release. If the prisoners were turned into
heroes, then the Japanese could become hostile to the United States, which would only
help the communist cause.44 The United States, wishing to avoid such a situation,
continued with the early release of convicted war criminals.
The involvement of the convicted men in public politics, and their campaign for
release was an early demonstration that democratic principles were understood and
employed among the Japanese to further their own cause. Public opinion regarding
Japanese war criminals began to shift in the early 1950s as the population began to see
the Class BC prisoners as soldiers who were caught in circumstances beyond their
control. Those Class BC prisoners held at Sugamo used the changing opinion to their
advantage. Capitalizing on their freedom of speech, they wrote letters and articles to the
press, to gain sympathy or clemency.
The outbreak of the Korean War caused a shortage of American soldiers, and the
American Occupation government began to turn control of Sugamo Prison over to the
Japanese in August of 1950. American officers supervised the Japanese wardens.
Captain Lonnie Adams gave the prisoners two options: they could govern themselves, or
they would have to remain locked up due to the shortage. The prisoners elected to
govern themselves, which they accomplished with no major disciplinary problems. As

43 Wilson,
44 Wilson,
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the Korean War continued, American personnel were phased out of Sugamo and replaced
by Japanese personnel. With the signing of the peace treaty in 1951, control of Sugamo
was turned over completely to the Japanese.45
With the American establishment of the parole system in 1950, the changing
public opinion regarding war criminals, and the turn Sugamo to Japanese management,
the Class BC prisoners began to press their government for release. In addition to the
letters, articles, and prisoner testimony, the inmates published their own newspapers.
One newspaper in particular, Sugamo, published from November 1952 to March 1953,
concerned itself with early release. Soon after the peace treaty was signed, many
organizations began to campaign on the behalf of or in support of the inmates, and
Sugamo focused on these activities as well as the peace treaty.46 Various women's
organizations offered tea ceremony classes to the prisoners, university professors
delivered lectures, and tourist groups actually visited Sugamo after the Japanese took
control. Businesses also supported the prisoners with donations, which included two
television sets 47 Sugamo reported on these activities, in addition to the activities of the
prison committee arguing for early release.48 Growing public sympathy for imprisoned
war criminals was clearly demonstrated by these businesses and organizations. Releasing
prisoners demonstrated the United States was attuned to the public opinion of its new ally
and willing to cooperate in matters that were important to Japanese people. These actions
also showed the Japanese that the United States was a cooperative ally, although both
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countries realized the importance of their alliance and likely would have ignored small
areas of disagreement such as the release of convicted war criminals.
The inmates at Sugamo used their freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
their connections to politicians and government leaders to push for their release. They
encouraged the Japanese government to act as a sovereign nation and take control of the
war criminal situation, garnering public support for their cause along the way. The
actions of these prisoners, and the show of public support, especially concerning the
widespread petition for their release showed that the United States accomplished its goal
of establishing American values such as the freedom of speech and support for
fundamental human rights as stated in the Potsdam Declaration.49 The last war criminal
was released in 1958.

CONCLUSION
While the Class BC trials of the "small fry" were not considered as important as
the Class A trial, the United States did use the lesser trials to its advantage. Ending the
trials demonstrated goodwill towards the Japanese. The early release of convicted war
criminals, over the protests of the Soviet Union, demonstrated leniency and strength.
Even though the Class BC trials did not occupy the limelight, they still proved useful to
the United States in its single-minded pursuit to contain Communism in East Asia.
The Class BC prisoners demonstrated that the United States had in fact instilled
an appreciation for democratic principles in the Japanese. It is difficult to determine to
what degree western principles were imbibed among the population so soon after the end
of the Occupation, but the early release campaign suggested that western ideas such as
49

Potsdam Declaration, Article 10.

Ill

the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press were adopted, at least on some level,
by the Japanese. The prisoners' use of their rights and the signing of the peace treaty
demonstrated the United States' success in Japan after the war. The Class BC trials were
only one of the United States' tactics. However, these often-ignored trials accomplished
more than the Tokyo Trial, and were used in the global political arena to prove to Japan
that wartime atrocities were in the past and that, with the signing of the peace treaty,
Japan could look towards a democratic future with powerful new allies.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Pacific war crimes trials led the Allies into unprecedented situations. The
trials marked the first time high ranking officials were removed from their posts, and the
first time they were tried for aggressive warfare and crimes against humanity. The
United States entered into the Pacific trials intending to punish those who committed
atrocities during the war. Instead, rising Cold War tensions overshadowed the trials and
in the case of the Tokyo Trial, took focus away from that goal. The Tokyo Trial became
less important to the United States as it became more focused on its own agenda,
demonstrating its strength to the Soviet Union and pursuing Japan as an ally against
Communism in East Asia.
According to Pritchard, in addition to the primary goal of identifying and
punishing major war criminals, the Tokyo Trial had a secondary goal to morally
reconstruct the Japanese people, and the world in general.1 Until the Tokyo Trial, much
of the Japanese public was unaware of the actions of their government and military
during the war. The education of the public on the events in the years prior to and during
the war was the greatest accomplishment of the Tokyo Trial. Due to the immense trial
record which detailed Japan's role in the war for the population, the United States and its
Allies could take "reasonable satisfaction" from the education the trial provided for the
'j

public. Given the clemency offered to General Ishii and the refusal to try Emperor
Hirohito, the United States cannot be said to have successfully accomplished the primary
goal to punish Japan's major war criminals.
1
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Michael Bess offers a positive perspective on the Tokyo Trial. Though at the
time, setting precedents for international law and future international tribunals was not
necessarily an explicit goal of the Tokyo Trial, those involved were aware of the potential
impact of their actions. Bess states:
The trials need to be understood not just as the concluding acts of World War II,
but as the catalysts of a revolutionary shift in the defense of basic human rights. Bringing
men like Goring and Tojo to justice was vitally important, but more important still was
the laying of legal and institutional foundations for dealing with the crimes of future
Gorings and Tojos who might arise in later generations. Herein lies the trials' real
historical (and moral) legacy: they constituted a qualitative leap toward a truly global
system of justice.3
The Tokyo Trial was part of a process that included the creation of the United Nations
and development of new international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights that sought to protect humanity against the horrors that occurred during
World War II.
Bess believes the Tokyo (and Nuremberg) Trials were not simply show trials. He
sees them as contributions to international law, allowing for some positive legacy. The
accomplishment of the Class BC trials at Yokohama was the punishment of war criminals
who were personally responsible for committing atrocities. This opinion was voiced as
early as 1950 in Robert A. Fearey's work on the Occupation of Japan from 1948 to
1950.4 Without the publicity of the A trial, the military commissions at Yokohama could
focus on delivering fair punishment for war crimes.
While the members of the military commissions at Yokohama could be appointed
by any Allied state, most commissions were composed of American members. The
absence of other Allied countries, most notably the Soviet Union, removed tensions from
3
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the court room and allowed the commissions to concentrate on the trials before them,
rather than on the assertion of their power in the post war world.
There were many things to take into consideration after World War II. The war
crimes trials, especially the BC trials, were only part of the rebuilding process in Japan.
The BC trials in particular, while given little publicity, did play an important role in the
end of the Occupation and subsequent peace treaty between Japan and the United States
and other Allies. Since the Tokyo Trial was over by the time serious peace treaty
considerations arose, it could not be used to further the interests of the United States.
Class BC trials were still in session however, and by ending the trials the United States
could demonstrate good faith and a willingness to cooperate with its former enemy.
Once the Yokohama trials ended, as an additional show of cooperation and perhaps in
response to public opinion in Japan, the United States allowed for the early release of
convicted war criminals. Perhaps because the Class BC trials were considered
unimportant, the United States could use them as a concession to the Japanese without
actually forfeiting anything of value.
Wilson's recent research also suggests that the Class BC trials accomplished more
in teaching the Japanese American democratic values. The issues surrounding the Tokyo
Trial raised doubts about the legitimacy of the trial itself as well as courtroom procedure,
reducing the credibility of claims about the democratic principles modeled for the
Japanese. The BC criminals sentenced to prison terms used American ideals in their
quest for early release from prison.
There remains a great deal of research to be done on the Pacific war crimes trials,
particularly the Class BC trials. Fearey stated the importance of the Class BC trials over
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the Tokyo Trial in 1950, but shortly after his claim the Class BC trials were almost
completely forgotten. Overshadowed by the drama of the Tokyo Trial, the records of the
trials at Yokohama offer a look at how the United States worked quietly to rehabilitate
Japan and model principles they hoped would take hold among the population. Though
the Tokyo Trial was touted as the most important war crimes trial in Japan, it was more
the showy end to World War II in the Pacific and a public spectacle that marked the end
of Japan's militaristic era. The long ignored trials of the "small fry" were more
successful and important in shaping the tense post war era.
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